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GRUBER, KENNETH J. Perceptions of Personal Victimizations: 
A Comparison of Predictions Made by the Defensive Attribution 
and Just World Models. (1981) Directed by: Dr. Jacquelyn 
Gaebelein. Pp; 143. 
Predictions derived from two models of victim perception, 
one suggesting that perceptions of victims are based on self-
protective needs (defensive attribution), and one advocating 
that perceptions of victims are based on a view that undeserved 
outcomes require justification (just world) were evaluated 
against subjects1 perceptions of stimulus cases portraying 
personal victimizations. Three factors, victim similarity, 
personal relevance of the situation, and the severity of the 
outcome for the victim, were manipulated in a 3 x 3 x 2 
between-groups design. The results indicated no support for 
the just world model and only limited support for the defen­
sive attribution model. A third model of victim perception, 
"normative expectations," was introduced to account for the 
pattern of responsibility attributions representing subjects' 
perceptions of the stimulus cases. This model suggests that 
people evaluate others in terms of expectations based on 
general social norms. The results are shown to conform to 
predictions derived from the model. Limitations to the — 
"normative expectations" model and the need for the develop­
ment of a more comprehensive model of victim perception are 
discussed. A framework for the development of a comprehensive 
model which can incorporate the existing models of victim 
perception, account for discrepancies in the literature, and 
provide a basis for additional models of victim perception 
is introduced. This framework is based on Kelley's (1972b) 
work involving "causal schemata." 
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When someone experiences a personal misfortune such 
as an accident, although sympathy and compassion may be 
extended to the victim, frequently we look for reasons why 
that particular individual was victimized. As a result, we 
often attempt to attribute the personal misfortune to some 
aspect of the individual's behavior or personality. In 
recent years, the interest in the phenomenon of how and why 
we attribute responsibility to other people, for both their 
behavior and the consequences of their behavior, has spawned 
a considerable amount of research investigating perceptions 
of accident victims and the conditions that influence victim-
sympathetic and victim-blame attitudes (e.g., Chaikin & 
Darley, 1973; McKillip & Posovac, 1975; Shaver, 1970; Shaw & 
McMartin, 1977; Walster, 1966). 
The tendency to perceive causal relationships between 
behavior and apparent consequences of that behavior is based 
on the theoretical proposition that people strive for mastery 
and control over their social environments (Wortman, 1976). 
This preference for personal control appears as a main basis 
for several of the major social perception models. For exam­
ple, cognitive consistency models of behavior (e.g., balance 
models, see Abelson, Aronson, McGuire, Newcomb, Rosenberg, & 
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Tannenbaum, 1968) are based on the assumption that people are 
motivated to believe that events follow one another in a pre­
dictable and orderly fashion. Similarly, a basic tenet of 
attribution theory is that people's motivation to achieve 
control has a pervasive influence on their attributions of 
causality. According to Kelley (1972a): 
The purpose of causal analysis—the function it serves 
for the species and the individual—is effective con­
trol. ... Controllable factors will have a high 
salience as candidates for causal explanation. In 
cases of ambiguity or doubt, the causal analysis will 
be biased in its outcome toward controllable factors, 
(pp. 22-23) 
The belief that people are motivated to maintain control 
over their personal environments is also a central theme in 
several theoretical accounts of causal explanations of 
personal misfortunes. Two theoretical models that have 
evolved as explanatory accounts of this phenomenon are defen­
sive attribution (Shaver, 1970; Shaw & McMartin, 1977; 
Walster, 1966) and just world (Lerner, Miller, & Holmes, 1976; 
Lerner & Simmons, 1966). 
Although over a decade has passed since the introduc­
tion of the defensive attribution and just world models, 
few studies have attempted to compare the models1 utility 
in accounting for perceptions of personal misfortunes. 
In an effort to address this deficit, the present paper 
reviews the conceptual bases of the two models and examines 
some of the empirical research which has attempted to inves­
tigate the explanatory power of each of the models. In 
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addition, in an effort to refine previous attempts to eval­
uate predictions made by the two models, an experiment is 
described which was designed to compare predictions made by 
each of the models using stimulus situations comprised of 
factors which are conceptually relevant to both models. The 
methodology, outcome, and discussion of the experiment are 
also presented. 
The Defensive Attribution Model 
The admission that everyone is to some degree vulnerable 
to catastrophic events is very threatening to most people. 
Because people do not like to believe they are as likely as 
everyone else to experience personal misfortunes, they tend 
to rationalize other people's misfortunes in ways which 
"protect" and minimize their own vulnerability to the same 
fate. As an explanation for this phenomenon, Walster (1966) 
postulated that when we hear of others who have suffered a 
small loss (a minor negative outcome), it is easy to feel 
sympathy for them, to attribute their misfortune to chance, 
and to acknowledge that relatively minor unpleasant outcomes 
can "happen to anyone." When the consequences of a per­
sonal misfortune are relatively serious, however, the per­
ception and interpretation of the incident is considerably 
different. As the magnitude of the misfortune increases, it 
becomes more difficult to simply attribute what has happened 
to chance or fate. A misfortune of serious proportions is 
threatening to most people, particularly if there is the 
4 
implication that such an incident "could happen to anyone." 
Consequently, to deny the possibility that they too might 
experience a similar misfortune, people often try to reduce 
the perceived threat either by denying that any misfortune 
has occurred or by explaining the cause of the incident in 
terms which are personally nonthreatening. Frequently, such 
threats are reduced or eliminated by attributing responsibil­
ity to someone (i.e., the victim or perpetrator) in the situa­
tion. Not infrequently, this leads to perceived causal links 
between the victim's character and what happened and/or per­
ceptions that the victim was somehow responsible for the 
incident. 
Walster (1966) hypothesized when individuals feel 
threatened by someone else's personal misfortune, in order 
to deny the possibility that, by chance, they too could suffer 
the same or similar fate, they are likely to perceive the 
victim as personally responsible rather than admit the inci­
dent could happen to them. By blaming the victim and believ­
ing that they would have behaved differently under the same 
circumstances, individuals can reassure themselves that they 
will not encounter the same misfortune. 
Walster (1966) tested this hypothesis by presenting sub­
jects a tape-recorded description of an accident in which a 
car parked and unoccupied, rolls down a hill. Several ver­
sions of the "accident" were used which included a descrip­
tion of the car owner, some minor details about the car 
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itself, and the fact the car owner did not have automobile 
insurance. The outcome of the accident was varied so that 
the consequences were portrayed as being minor (no damage or 
the car rolled part way down the hill but was stopped by a 
tree stump which slightly dented the fender) or quite serious 
(the car rolled down the hill, crashed through the window 
of a store and either almost hit two people or hit two peo­
ple and injured them). Consistent with Walster's predictions, 
subjects assigned more responsibility to the owner of the 
car when the outcome was serious than when it was minor. 
Although subjects did not perceive the car owner as more 
careless (the cause of the accident was due to a faulty brake 
cable), they did perceive the car owner to be under greater 
moral obligation to have had automobile insurance and to 
have had the brakes checked more frequently when the conse­
quences were serious than when they were mild. 
In a later study/ Walster (1967) attempted to replicate 
her earlier findings using a different stimulus situation, 
but did not find support for the predicted relationship of 
attributed personal responsibility and severity of outcome 
of a personal misfortune. Shaver (1970) suggested the fail­
ure of Walster's 1967 study to support her prediction of 
greater attributions of personal responsibility as a function 
of an increase in the magnitude of the outcome of a personal 
misfortune could be accounted for by considering the relevance 
of the stimulus situation to the subjects making the 
responsibility evaluations. In Walster's 1966 study, the 
relevance of the situation was probably high, inasmuch as 
the subjects were college students and the stimulus situa­
tion described a young male and an accident involving his 
car. In Walster's 1967 study, however, the stimulus situa­
tion portrayed an individual who purchases a home and subse 
quently experiences an unanticipated event which leads to 
the investor either taking a loss, making a profit, or 
neither taking a loss nor making a profit. Due to the like 
lihood that the stimulus person was perceived as older in 
comparison to the average age of the subject sample and 
because the situation involved a business deal with which 
college students are not likely to have had first-hand 
experience, it is quite probable the situation was not 
very relevant to the student-subjects. 
Shaver (1970) revised Walster's original hypothesis by 
suggesting that only if a given incident is personally rele 
vant to observers will there be the possibility that they 
will feel threatened and resort to making self-protective 
attributions. The relevance of a situation is based on its 
perceived situational and personal "affective significance" 
(Heider, 1958). Observers must perceive the possibility 
that they will some day find themselves in a situation sim­
ilar to that of the stimulus person (situational relevance) 
and that the degree of personal similarity or dissimilarity 
they share with the stimulus person is apparent enough for 
7 
them to either identify with or differentiate themselves from 
that individual (personal relevance). The extent to which 
observers perceive themselves as similar or dissimilar to the 
stimulus person affects how they perceive that individual's 
role in effecting personal outcomes. Because people tend 
to evaluate favorably others whom they perceive as personally 
similar to themselves, unfortunate experiences involving a 
similar other often are perceived in such a way as to 
maintain a favorable impression of that individual. This 
same effort generally is not made when a personally dissimi­
lar other is involved; in fact, observers may bias their 
perceptions of the individual's actions to "support" the 
perception that the individual is personally dissimilar. 
Thus, by attributing less personal responsibility to a simi­
lar other and greater responsibility to a dissimilar other 
for a personal misfortune, observers are able to distort the 
probability and the circumstances of the event, and presum­
ably, the likelihood that they will experience a similar fate. 
Shaver (1970) tested his reformulation of Walster's 
(1966) hypothesis in a series of experiments using variations 
of the accident described in Walster (1966) and an additional 
situation portraying an industrial laboratory accident. Sit­
uational relevance was assumed on the basis that the nature 
of the accident was presumably one with which subjects could 
readily identify. In the presentations involving the car 
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accident situation, personal relevance was varied by manip­
ulating the age and educational status of the stimulus per­
son. The stimulus person was portrayed either as younger 
(a 16-year-old high school student), as about the same age 
(a 19-year-old college student), or as older (a 22-year-old 
graduate student) than the subjects. The industrial labora­
tory accident was presented primarily to test Walster's 
(1966) suggestion that responsibility attributions are 
directly related to the relative severity of the outcome. 
The accident was depicted as occurring during a demonstration 
by the stimulus person of a piece of laboratory equipment, 
which shatters and sends out metal splinters, one of which 
hits a child spectator. Injury to the child was either mild 
(the splinter lodged in his wrist) or serious (the splinter 
hits him in the eye and produces permanent loss of vision). 
Shaver did not find support for Walster's assertion 
that an increase in the severity of an unfortunate outcome 
would produce a corresponding increment in attributed respon­
sibility. He did find, however, support for the proposi­
tion that responsibility attributions are affected by the 
relevance of the incident to the observer. Although age 
and responsibility for the accident were positively 
related (i.e., the younger stimulus person was attributed 
the least responsibility), subjects perceived the same age 
stimulus person as the most cautious prior to the accident. 
Shaver interpreted these results to imply that the more 
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personally relevant situation (the one involving a same age 
stimulus person) produced the need among subjects to protect 
themselves against the possibility that the accident could 
happen to them. Hence, when the stimulus incident involved 
a personally similar other, subjects apparently were less 
inclined to view the stimulus person as responsible. 
In an extension of Shaver's (1970) work, Shaw and 
McMartin (1977) suggested that differences in attributed 
levels of personal responsibility for a given outcome, as a 
function of the degree of personal similarity between the 
stimulus person and the observer, represented different self-
protective attributional strategies. According to Shaw and 
McMartin (1977), when confronted with another's personal-mis­
fortune which observers perceive as situationally relevant 
(and thus personally threatening) and which involves a victim 
they perceive as personally similar, the victim's misfortune 
is likely to be explained in terms of "blame-avoidance" 
attributions (e.g., the incident was accidental and not the 
victim's fault)as a way of maintaining their own innocence 
if a similar misfortune should befall them. In contrast, if 
the situation is perceived as relevant and the victim as 
personally dissimilar, Shaw and McMartin contend that observ­
ers are expected to justify the incident in terms of "harm-
avoidance" attributions, e.g., attribute some degree of 
personal responsibility and/or identify some aspect of the 
victim's personality or personal characteristics that 
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explains why the individual was victimized and which provides 
a basis for why a similar event would not happen to them ("the 
victim is not like me, I would have been able to avoid what 
happened"). Thus, depending on the degree of personal simi­
larity perceived by observers, a victim's personal responsi­
bility for an unfortunate event may be exaggerated in order 
to assure observers that they will not be viewed at fault if 
a similar fate happens to them. The intensity with which 
observers will use "blame-avoidance" or "harm-avoidance" 
attributions is dependent oh the severity or magnitude of the 
outcome of the misfortune (Shaw & McMartin, 1977). 
Shaw and McMartin (1977) presented subjects a descrip­
tion of a chemistry/nutrition laboratory accident in which 
the outcome was either mild (no personal injury was suffered) 
or serious (several persons were injured). The context of 
the accident—a student in a college laboratory conducting 
an experiment—was assumed to be situationally relevant to 
the subjects. Personal relevance was "manipulated" by assum­
ing opposite sex stimulus persons would be perceived by 
subjects as characteristically different. Same sex stimulus 
persons were presumed to be perceived by subjects as per­
sonally similar. In neither case was there empirical verifi­
cation that situational and personal relevance had in fact 
been manipulated. Nonetheless, Shaw and McMartin found their 
subjects tended to blame an opposite sex other (personally 
dissimilar) and not blame a same sex other (personally 
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similar). They also found that attributions of responsibil­
ity were directly related to the severity of the outcome. 
When the accident involved a same sex (personally similar) 
stimulus person, the more serious the accident's outcome, the 
less personal responsibility subject-observers assigned to 
the stimulus person. In contrast, when the accident involved 
an opposite sex other (personally dissimilar), subjects tended 
to blame the stimulus person more. These results suggest sup­
port for the two attributional tendencies identified by Shaw 
and McMartin (1977). The results also provide partial support 
for Walster's (1966) original prediction that the severity of 
the outcome of an event will affect attributed levels of per­
sonal responsibility. Dissimilar stimulus persons were 
assigned more personal responsibility as the severity of the 
outcome of the accident increased. 
In summary, the defensive attribution model is predi­
cated on the belief that people prefer to believe they usually 
can avoid negative personal outcomes, or if they cannot avoid 
them, they do not deserve to be held responsible if some 
catastrophic event happens to them. To maintain this per­
spective the defensive attribution model suggests that peo­
ple, when confronted with another's personal misfortune, 
which could possibly happen to them, will invoke explanations 
(defensive attributions) for the incident which either exon­
erates them from responsibility if a similar misfortune 
should involve them or assures that a similar event could 
not happen to them. 
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The Just World Model 
An alternate explanation for why people tend to perceive 
the victim of an accident or other personal misfortune as 
being at least partly responsible is suggested by Lerner's 
(1970, 1974, 1977) just world hypothesis. According to 
Lerner (Lerner, 1974: Lerner, Holmes, & Miller, 1976), 
people tend to believe the world is a just and predictable 
place. Rather than believe personal outcomes are the result 
of mysterious or uncontrollable factors, Lerner asserts peo­
ple prefer to believe they are responsible for their own 
actions and the actions of others which involve them. This 
belief leads people to anticipate a positive relationship 
between merit and reward—one in which "people get what they 
deserve and deserve what they get." 
Lerner (1977) suggests the belief that "people get 
what they deserve" is threatened when someone is observed to 
experience an apparently unjust outcome, one which she/he 
ordinarily would not be expected to experience (e.g., when 
a presumably innocent person is murdered). Because the 
observation of such an event is personally discomforting, an 
observer feels threatened and reduces the perceived threat by 
attempting to justify why the victim received what she/he 
did. 
The extent an occurrence of an unjust outcome is justi­
fied depends on how much the particular outcome is viewed as 
unjust. Consequently, the greater the discrepancy between 
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what one receives and what one "deserves" to receive, the 
more threatening that situation is to the belief that the 
world is "just." This suggests that incidents which result 
in mild negative outcomes (one in which the victim exper­
iences only minor discomfort or suffering), generally will 
produce only minor threats to people's perceptions of a 
"just world." Because such incidents are believed to happen 
to almost everyone and because the perceived discrepancy 
between "what one gets and deserves to get" is of little 
magnitude, they generally are not very threatening to concerns 
about the justness of the world. Incidents which result in 
considerable suffering or injury, however, generally are not 
perceived as common experiences. When some serious harm or 
injury occurs to a victim, the relationship between what the 
victim experienced and what s/he "deserved" to experience 
becomes very salient. Because the relationship between 
serious or very negative outcomes and "deservedness" typically 
is not easily explained, the occurrence of such an event often 
poses considerable threat to the view that the world is 
"just." 
To be sure, people do not and can not respond to all 
instances of perceived injustice, and consequently, many such 
events go unheeded. Injustices which are perceived to have 
little impact on individuals' personal lives and their con­
tinued trust that the world will remain orderly and just do 
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not create a sufficient threat to their perception of a "just 
world." Only when the perceived injustice becomes suffi­
ciently relevant as a result of either some personal identi­
fication with the victim or the situation or in some other 
way which threatens observers' personal view of justice, 
do just world determinations become likely. Consequently, 
the situation need not be relevant in the sense that 
observers might someday find themselves involved in order 
to pose a threat to observers' belief in a "just world." 
Instead, it needs only to represent an instance in which the 
discrepancy between what is "deserved" and what is received 
appears to be in contradiction with the order and justness 
of the world. 
Once the observers1 sense of justice is adequately 
threatened (the discrepancy between what was "deserved" and 
what was received is perceived as sufficiently "unjust"), 
observers first are expected to try to resolve the perceived 
injustice by compensating the victim and/or punishing the 
perpetrator. However, if justification of the incident cannot 
be satisfied through compensation of the victim or punishment 
of the perpetrator, observers are likely to resort to alter­
ing their perceptions of the victim's behavior or per­
sonal character so that the victim is perceived as deserving 
her/his fate. If the victim is perceived as behaviorally 
responsible for her/his fate, then observers may justify the 
incident by downgrading the victim's actions. However, if 
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the victim is perceived to be behaviorally innocent and 
her/his fate cannot be attributed to something she/he did 
or did not do, observers may justify the incident by 
derogating the victim's personal character—implying that 
due to the victim's "bad" character she/he "got what she/he 
deserved." 
Whether an individual.is perceived to have "deserved" 
her/his fate is generally determined on the basis of a sub­
jective evaluation of: (a) the individual's personal char­
acter, (b) the individual's behavior in the situation, and/or 
(c) chance or capricious circumstances. The latter reason 
(that one's fate may be due to chance or capricious events), 
however, is less likely than the other two alternatives. 
This is because the acknowledgment that someone is a victim 
of a chance or a capricious event implies a lack of control 
over one's outcomes and is generally contrary to the belief 
that one earns or is in some way responsible for what happens 
to that individual. Thus, in the event there is some ques­
tion concerning whether the victim "deserved" what happened, 
it is likely the victim's fate will be justified, at least 
in part, as due to her/his personal character and/or some 
action taken or not taken by the individual. 
The extent to which the victim or the victim's 
behavior is scrutinized usually depends on what observers 
perceive to have happened or what they infer may have hap­
pened. If a victim is perceived as "deserving" her/his 
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misfortune, then no threat is posed to observers' belief 
that the world is just and the victim is easily derogated 
or blamed in accordance to the degree the victim "got what 
she/he deserved." If, however, a misfortune occurs involv­
ing someone whom observers do not expect to experience an 
unpleasant fate (i.e., someone with whom they personally 
identify), then they are faced with the prospect of explain­
ing how such an incident could occur. 
Because the seriousness of accidents and other personal 
misfortunes are often unmistakable, maintaining a just world 
perspective frequently involves a fault-finding examination 
of the victim and the victim's behavior. According to the 
model, the way observers might do this is by altering their 
perceptions of the seriousness of the incident or their 
perceptions of the victim's character and the role the victim 
may have had in causing the incident. As a result, for a 
situation in which the victim ordinarily would be considered 
behaviorally "innocent" (e.g., a situation involving a simi­
lar other), observers may perceive some flaw in the victim's 
character as justification for the incident. On the other 
hand, if the victim's character is irreproachable, then some 
distortion of her/his behavior to account for the victim's 
misfortune becomes more probable. 
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Just World and Defensive Attribution as Viable 
Models of Victim Perception 
Over the last decade, a number of studies have been 
conducted which have empirically tested predictions made by 
the just world and defensive attribution models. Although 
the results are far from conclusive, support for the just 
world model has been quite limited, while a number of studies 
have reported data which appear to support the defensive 
attribution model (Chaikin & Darley, 1973; Kaplan & Miller, 
1978; McKillip & Posovac, 1975; Shaver, 1970; Shaw & McMar-
tin, 1977; Shaw & Skolnick, 1971). As a result, there has 
been the tendency on the part of some researchers to conclude 
that the defensive attribution model is a better or more 
accurate model of victim perception. The adequacy of this 
conclusion, however, is limited for several reasons. 
One reason is that despite the fact that several studies 
have reported evidence in direct contradiction to predictions 
made by the just world model, most of these studies have 
only reported data refuting one or two predictions of the 
model (e.g., innocent victims will be derogated more than 
responsible ones), while virtually ignoring results which 
are not contradictory to the other predictions of the model. 
For example, Miller, Smith, Ferree, and Taylor (1976) found 
subjects attributed significantly more responsibility to 
victims of accidents or personal victimizations when some 
level of personal culpability was evident than when the 
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victims were described as "innocent." A culpable woman 
driver was perceived as having the most responsibility, a 
female rape victim as having an intermediate amount of 
responsibility, and an "innocent" woman pedestrian as having 
the least amount of responsibility for personal injuries suf­
fered as a result of their respective mishaps. The culpable 
driver also was viewed as less liked and less intelligent 
than the other two stimulus persons. No differences in 
likability were reported between the rape and pedestrian 
victims. Miller et al. (1976) interpreted their results as 
nonsupportive of the just world model because the culpable 
victim was faulted more for her injuries and liked less than 
the more "innocent" victims. The investigators argued that 
according to the just world model, behaviorally innocent 
victims should have been derogated more than culpable ones. 
However, this reasoning fails to take into account that an 
observer's "just world" is not threatened when one is per­
ceived to "get what one deserves." That is, victim blame 
and victim derogation are only likely if the event creates 
a threat to an observer's sense of justice and there is no 
other way to explain or justify the victim's fate. If an 
innocent victim's misfortune can be explained by means other 
than personal responsibility, or if sufficient compensation 
can be provided to amend the injustice, attributions of 
victim blame or victim derogation are not necessary. 
Given this reasoning, Miller et al.'s data actually provide 
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some direct support for the just world model. In spite of 
no differences in perceived severity of injury, likability, 
and intelligence between rape and pedestrian victims, the 
rape victim was blamed more for her victimization, which 
according to the model is one way in which subjects may have 
justified the incidence of the rape. 
Another reason why the just world model should be given 
further consideration is that a critical element of the model, 
the degree to which a personal misfortune is perceived as 
"deserved," has not been made clear in many of the stimulus 
situations which have been used. For the most part, the 
research on the perception of the victimization of others has 
portrayed stimulus persons as "victims" of accidents in 
which the outcome and the stimulus person's role in producing 
that outcome have been very ambiguous (Fishbein & Azjen, 1973: 
Vidmar & Crinklaw, 1974). For example, in the studies by 
Shaver (1970), Shaw and Skolnick (1971), and Shaw and McMartin 
(1977) involving an "accident," the stimulus person was not 
the only recipient of a negative outcome; in fact in most 
conditions, someone else experienced a more serious misfor­
tune. Yet, it is not clear whether perceptions of personal 
responsibility were based on only the involvement of the 
stimulus person in the "accident" or on the involvement of 
the stimulus person plus the injury suffered by others in the 
situation. Equally unclear is whether or not the severity 
of the outcome of incidents such as chemical explosions in 
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laboratories and cars rolling down hills due to faulty 
brakes can be evaluated unambiguously as something for which 
the stimulus person can be reasonably held responsible. As 
a result, because the research generally has not provided 
appropriate stimulus situations for assessing the just world 
model, conclusions regarding reported "limited" applications 
of the model must be considered as tentative. 
A third consideration which suggests that the defensive 
attribution model may not be necessarily a better explanatory 
model of perceptions of personal misfortunes is related to a 
conceptual confound inherent in many accident situations 
(Chaiken & Darley, 1973T Landy & Aronson, 1969). When the vic­
tim is also the perpetrator of an accident, perpetrator culpa­
bility and victim responsibility are confounded. Unfortunately, 
much of the past research which has assessed perceptions of 
personal misfortunes has used accident situations in which 
the stimulus person has been portrayed as both a "victim" 
and as a causal agent of harm to others (a perpetrator) in 
the situation. For example, in the Walster (1966) and Shaver 
(1970) studies, a car accident was described in which the 
"victim" was also the owner of the car involved in the acci­
dent. As the owner of the car, the stimulus person (a young 
male) was portrayed as both liable for the damage and/or 
injury done by his car and as a victim responsible for the 
damage and/or personal injury. Yet, because he wasn't in the 
car at the time of the accident nor was he injured in the car 
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accident, whether subjects responded to the stimulus person 
as a perpetrator (perceiving him as responsible for the out­
come) or as an unfortunate victim (due to the damage done to 
and by his car) is not clear. Another example of victim-
perpetrator confounding is evident in the Shaw and Skolnick 
(1971) and Shaw and McMartin (1977) studies. Although the 
details of the accidents in the two studies differed slightly, 
the stimulus situation in the two studies involved a chemistry 
or nutrition laboratory and a college student who has an 
"accident" while conducting an experiment. In the severe out­
come conditions, the result of the accident (a chemical 
explosion) was described as harming both the stimulus person 
and others present in the situation. Consequently, the stimu­
lus person could conceivably have been perceived either as a 
victim, as the responsible party for the accident, or as both 
the victim and perpetrator. 
Hence, based on the criticisms outlined above, it seems 
advisable to reconsider the utility of the just world model 
in a context that is free of the confound inherent in an acci­
dent situation. One type of personal misfortune which is 
very comparable to an accident situation but provides a more 
identifiable dimension of "deservedness" (on the basis of what 
the victim does or does not do) is a personal or criminal 
victimization. Like an accident, a personal victimization can 
involve a range of outcomes (from severe to mild), can occur 
along a dimension of personal relevance (from high to low), 
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and can happen to a personally similar or dissimilar other. 
A personal victimization also has several advantages over an 
accident situation that makes it more suitable in a test of 
predictions of the two models. 
First, the role of the victim is clearly unconfounded 
with the role of the perpetrator (one possible argument 
against this contention involves the quasi-legal concept of 
victim precipitation—the victim is perceived as initiating 
or in some other major way responsible for the incident 
(e.g., see Amir, 1967). Second, although both an accident 
and personal victimization may be equally unpredictable in 
the sense that in a given situation "anything can happen", 
the foreseeability of a personal victimization is likely to 
be more constant than that of an accident. Personal victimi­
zations require that another person be present in the situa­
tion, whereas accidents can occur without another person 
present. Thus, the probability of a personal victimization 
in a given situation is objectively more predictable when the 
presence of others is possible. Third, because the severity 
of the outcome may be perceived as directly related to the 
victim's behavior (i.e., what the victim does or does not do, 
see Krulewitz & Nash, 1979; Scroggs, 1976) and thus partly 
controlled by the victim, judgments of "deservedness" partic­
ularly in relation to the severity of the outcome are more 
clearly based on victim-related variables. 
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Previous Research on the Perceptions of a 
Personal Victimization 
The research to date utilizing a personal victimization 
situation has produced mixed support for the defensive attri­
bution and just world models. For example, Smith, Keating, 
Hester, and Mitchell (1976) manipulated the social respect­
ability of a rape victim by varying occupational role in 
order to make the perception of sexually provocative behavior 
(an obvious basis for ascribed victim responsibility), more 
or less likely. Male and female subjects were presented 
written cases of a rape victimization in which the victim was 
described either as a topless-bottomless dancer (low respect­
ability), as a social worker (moderate respectability), or as 
a Catholic nun (high respectability), and as either acquainted 
or unacquainted with her assailant. 
Major support for the just world model was provided by 
the finding that victim and assailant responsibility were 
essentially uncorrelated. In consonance with the model, this 
result suggests that subjects perceived the occurrence of 
the rape as due to factors other than the assailant's 
actions. The authors found that the level of attributed 
responsibility differed as a function of social role. Over­
all, the nun was viewed as less responsible (more innocent) 
for her rape than either the social worker or the dancer. In 
addition, the nun and social worker were viewed less likely 
than the dancer to have encouraged the rape. Subjects also 
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identified more with the nun and the social worker and 
expressed greater liking for the nun and the social worker 
than for the dancer. 
For the dancer, and to a lesser extent the social worker, 
provocative behavior was identified as part of the reason they 
were victimized. Overall, victims unacquainted with their 
offenders were attributed more responsibility for their rapes 
than were victims who were previously acquainted with their 
assailants. This effect was particularly strong for the nun 
victim; she was viewed as significantly more responsible for 
the assault when she was portrayed as unacquainted with her 
assailant than when she was portrayed as being acquainted with 
him. These results also suggest support for the just world 
model. An assault by a stranger is generally perceived as more 
serious than one by an assailant with whom the victim is 
acquainted. As a result, a victimization by a stranger 
requires more justification, particularly when it involves 
someone who is liked and respected. In the case of the nun, 
subjects were faced with a situation in which they had to 
account for why an individual, who is normally thought of as 
sexually nonprovocative, was sexually assaulted. Consistent 
with the just world model, subjects apparently justified the 
nun's fate by assigning more personal responsibility when she 
was victimized by an assailant with whom she was unacquainted 
than when the attack was by someone she knew (which was 
presumably perceived as less serious). 
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Despite the consistent pattern of most of the findings, 
all the results of this study were not in clear support of the 
just world model. For example, subjects perceived the vic­
timizations of the nun and the social worker by an assailant 
with whom the victims were unacquainted as due more to chance 
factors than when the victim was acquainted with her offender. 
According to the just world model, victimizations involving 
unacquainted victim-offender pairs should be perceived as 
more serious and more threatening to the notion of a "just 
world" than when the victim is acquainted with her attacker. 
This result, however, may not be completely inconsistent with 
the model due to the fact that subjects identified strongly 
with the nun and the social worker victims, and according to 
the model, identification with the victim can lead to more 
complex justification of why the victim was assaulted. 
One other result that does not clearly conform to the 
just world perspective is the fact that, although the victims 
were perceived differently in terms of their responsibility 
for the rape incidents, subjects did not differ in recommend­
ing punishment for the assailant as a function of the social 
role of the victim. In the context of the just world model, 
the victim's social role should have affected the amount of 
justification required to resolve the threat to subjects' 
belief in a "just world," which then, should have resulted 
in different levels of recommended punishment (compensation). 
The lack of differences in recommended levels of punishment 
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by victim's social role, however, may be due to the fact 
that subjects assigned high levels of punishment for all 
offenders independent of the extent to which the victim was 
perceived as responsible. 
In a study investigating the perception of rape inci­
dents, Krulewitz and Nash (1979) also found data in sup­
port of predictions made by the just world model. These 
investigators presented written case accounts to subjects 
in which they manipulated the level of victim resistance in 
the course of a rape or an attempted rape. The results 
indicated that the attributed level of responsibility to the 
victim and the assailant varied as a function of whether the 
incident was a rape or an attempted rape. The victim was 
viewed as relatively more responsible for the incident when 
it was a rape than when it was an attempted rape. Attribu­
tions of "victim blame" and "victim fault" also tended to 
be greater when the victimization was a rape than when it 
was an attempted rape. Consistent with the assigned level 
of responsibility, the assailant was perceived as more 
responsible for the attempted rape than for the rape. In 
addition, although female subjects identified more with the 
victims than did males, they also attributed more responsi­
bility to the victim. Thus, in support of the just world 
model subjects assigned more responsibility when the victim 
experienced a more serious outcome. 
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In addition to the assignment of greater responsibil­
ity on the part of the victim of a more serious outcome, 
subjects recommended longer prison sentences for the rape 
assailant than for the attempted rape assailant. This 
pattern of results is consistent with the model's prediction 
that individuals, in an effort to restore a sense of jus­
tice, will make attributions which wronged victims. 
In another study which provides support for the just 
world model, Jones and Aronson (1973) presented subjects case 
accounts of either a rape or an attempted rape of either a 
married, single-virgin, or divorced woman and found that 
attributions of responsibility differed as a function of the 
respectability of the victim. As victim respectability 
increased (respectability was determined a priori by a panel 
of students similar to the subjects), attributions of fault 
for the incident also increased. The more "respectable" 
single virgin and married woman victims were perceived as 
more at fault than the less "respectable" divorced woman vic­
tim. Apparently, the knowledge that highly respectable 
females can be raped, threatened subjects' need to believe in 
a world that is "just", and in order to explain the incident 
they found it necessary to find fault with the actions of the 
victim. 
Jones and Aronson (1973) also found that the social 
respectability of the victim affected the tendency of subjects 
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to assign severe penalties to the offender. Subjects 
assigned significantly more severe penalties (longer prison 
sentences) to the offender of the married woman victim (high 
respectability) than to the offender of the divorced woman 
victim (low respectability). The severity of the penalty 
assigned to the offender of the virgin female victim was 
approximately midway between that assigned to the married 
and divorced woman victims. 
These results support the prediction that observers of a 
personal misfortune are likely to try to compensate a victim 
in order to justify the victim's fate. Compensation in the 
form of recommendations of punishment is one way to achieve 
this (Kerr & Kurtz, 1977). Because respectable persons are 
not expected to experience serious personal misfortunes, when 
they do, justification of such an event may involve a critical 
and possibly negative evaluation of the victim's role in the 
incident. Consequently, justification of the event involves 
considerable blame attributed to the victim, but according 
to the just world model, compensation to "fit" the outcome 
(e.g., punishment of the offender) may also be necessary. 
Hence, in the Jones and Aronson study, while the more respect­
able victim was apparently perceived as more at fault for her 
misfortune, she was also perceived as more "deserving" of 
appropriate compensation. 
Finally, although subjects did not fault victims of a 
rape more than victims of an attempted rape (which is predicted 
29 
by the model), there was some indication that the rape inci­
dent as compared with the attempted rape incident was per­
ceived as more serious and potentially more threatening to 
the belief in a "just world." Subjects recommended longer 
prison sentences for the offenders of both the married and 
virgin woman victims when the incident was portrayed as a 
rape than when it was portrayed as an attempted rape. Pre­
sumably, harsher sentences were recommended to reflect the 
greater need to justify through compensation the victims of 
the objectively more serious act (the rape). 
Several attempts to replicate Jones' and Aronson's data 
have failed to produce much additional support for the just 
world model (Kahn, Gilbert, Latta, Deutsch, Hagen, Hill, 
McGaughey, Ryen, & Wilson, 1977; Kerr & Kurtz, 1977). Kerr 
and Kurtz (1977) presented subjects the same rape account used 
in the Jones and Aronson (1973) study and manipulated the 
severity of the outcome of the incidents by varying the amount 
of physical injury suffered by the victim. They also pre­
sented subjects a case involving an armed robbery in which an 
"innocent" male bystander, of high or low social respectabil­
ity, was seriously or mildly injured. For the rape case, no 
difference was found in attributed fault as a function of the 
respectability of the victim's social role. Likewise, the 
amount of attributed victim responsibility for the incident 
did not differ as a function of the physical injury exper­
ienced by the victim. Both results are in contradiction to 
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predictions based on the just world model. The results, 
however, did indicate that longer prison sentences were rec­
ommended when the victim experienced the more serious out­
come (the more extensive physical injury) which could be inter­
preted as "compensation" for the victim. 
For the evaluation of the robbery case, overall, no rela­
tionship was found between subjects' assignment of responsi­
bility and the social respectability of the victim. The 
length of recommended prison sentences also was not affected 
by the social role of the victim. However, a sex difference 
in the perception of the victims and their assailants in the 
robbery case does provide some limited support for the just 
world model. Although female subjects perceived the incidents 
similarly across all stimulus conditions, male subjects per­
ceived the victim as more responsible as the degree of victim 
suffering increased. Thus, in line with just world rationaliz­
ing, males apparently thought the seriously injured male 
bystander "got what he deserved." 
Kahn et al. (1977) also were unable to replicate the 
major findings of the Jones and Aronson study. These investi­
gators assessed perceived victim responsibility for victims 
portrayed in roles of a virgin, a married woman, a married 
woman who was pregnant, and a divorcee. They also manipulated 
the social role of the assailant. They found no differences 
in the attribution of fault for the rape incidents either as 
a function of the social role (respectability) of the victim 
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or as a function of the social role of the assailant. Recom­
mendations for years of imprisonment also failed to show 
differences across stimulus conditions. 
Fulero and Delara (1976) in the context of the defensive 
attribution model suggested an alternate interpretation of 
Jones' and Aronson's (1973) data. They argued that rather 
than the level of social respectability as the focal point 
for responsibility attributions, the perceived personal 
similarity of the victim to subjects could better explain 
Jones' and Aronson's results. To test their proposal, Fulero 
and Delara had subjects rate a number of stimulus persons 
including the ones used in the Jones and Aronson study, in 
terms of their own personal similarity to the roles and in 
terms of social respectability. The results indicated that 
subjects viewed themselves as more similar to a young divorcee 
or a married woman than to a single virgin. Based on these 
findings (methodological considerations aside), Fulero and 
Delara reinterpreted the Jones and Aronson data in terms of 
the defensive attribution model. First, because the events 
were depicted as occurring on a college campus, the situation 
could reasonably be assumed as relevant to college student 
subjects. Second, on the basis of personal similarity rather 
than social respectability, less responsibility was assigned 
to the presumably more personally similar victim, the divorcee, 
than to the less similar victim, the virgin. Third, consis­
tent with the "blame-avoidance" and "harm-avoidance" tendencies 
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identified by the model, subjects apparently assigned greater 
blame to the more dissimilar victims (the married woman and 
the virgin) as the seriousness of their personal misfortune 
increased; the married woman and the virgin were faulted more 
for their involvement when the outcome was a rape than when 
it was an attempted rape. 
Fulero and Delara further tested their explanation by 
assessing perceived responsibility for rape victims who were 
portrayed as personally similar (a same age student) or dis­
similar (a middle-aged housewife). The results indicated 
that for female subjects, personally similar victims were 
accorded less responsibility than dissimilar ones. No differ­
ence in level of attributed responsibility as a function of 
personal similarity was found for male subjects. Female sub­
jects also reported a more positive impression of the student 
victim than they had for the housewife victim; male subjects 
held the opposite impression. 
In a second experiment, the authors presented male and 
female subjects a description of a rape incident involving 
either a same-age female student (a personally similar other) 
or a middle-aged female alcoholic (a dissimilar low respect­
able other). Female subjects again assigned less responsibil­
ity to the more personally similar victim and more responsi­
bility to the personally dissimilar victim. They also viewed 
the older, dissimilar victim as more likely to have provoked 
the attack than the younger, more similar victim. The older 
33 
dissimilar victim's behavior at the time of the rape—"walk­
ing alone at night" was assessed by female subjects as more 
inappropriate for the dissimilar victim than for a similar 
victim. Male subjects1 ratings of victim responsibility did 
not differ across stimulus conditions. 
In sum, in support of a defensive attribution explana­
tion, Fulero and Delara found that female subjects tended to 
identify more with a similar other and reduce attributions 
of responsibility relative to a dissimilar other. The use of 
explanations ("victim-provoked") to downgrade the behavior of 
a dissimilar other and. the more favorable impression of the 
more similar victim is consistent with the "blame-avoidance" 
and "harm-avoidance" tendencies predicted by the model. 
Feldman-Summers and Lindner (1976) investigated college 
students1 perceptions of a personal victimization by present­
ing them a case account of either a rape, an attempted rape, 
or a physical assault involving victims of differing social 
respectability. They manipulated social respectability by 
portraying the victim either as a prostitute, a divorcee, a 
married woman, a single nonvirgin, or a single virgin; the 
prostitute had the least social respectability, the single 
virgin the most, the other roles occupied intermediate ranges. 
(It should be noted that the respectability ratings were 
consistent with Jones' and Aronson's data and inconsistent 
with Fulero's and Delara's similarity ratings.) This sug­
gests that similarity and respectability, even if highly 
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correlated, are independent dimensions. Feldman-Summers and 
Lindner found that victim responsibility was related nega­
tively to victim respectability. When the victim was por­
trayed either as a prostitute or a divorcee, she was viewed 
as more responsible for what happened to her than when she 
was identified as either a married woman, a single non-
virgin, or a single virgin. The more socially respectable 
victims were also viewed as suffering more than the less 
respectable victims and to have experienced greater psycho­
logical impact from their experience. These relationships 
were consistent across the three types of victimizations, 
although the effects were more pronounced for the rape and 
attempted rape incidents. 
Although no data were reported to indicate the extent to 
which subjects identified with the various social roles repre­
sented by the victims, the results do indicate that female 
subjects identified more with the victim than did males. 
Regardless of the type of victimization, female subjects rec­
ommended longer prison sentences, assigned more assailant 
guilt, and perceived greater psychological impact on the vic­
tim (all victims were female) than did males. The ratings of 
the stimulus persons by male subjects essentially paralleled 
that of the females, but were of lesser magnitude. 
The pattern of results can be interpreted as support for 
the defensive attribution model. If subjects identified more 
with the married woman, single virgin, and single nonvirgin 
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victims than with the divorcee or prostitute victims, then 
the pattern of results indicates that subjects assigned 
greater responsibility to victims who were the most personally 
dissimilar. Also consistent with the defensive attribution 
model were the ratings of the degree of psychological impact 
the incidents were perceived to have had on the victims. The 
more personally similar victims were rated as more affected, 
the less personally similar victims were perceived as less 
affected by their experiences. This suggests that subjects 
viewed the victimizations of similar and dissimilar others 
differently. 
A Comparison of Predictions Made by the Models: 
Relevant Dimensions of the Just World and 
Defensive Attribution Models 
Because few studies have compared predictions made by 
the just world and defensive attribution models in stimulus 
situations in which theoretically relevant dimensions have 
been manipulated (e.g., Chaikin & Darley, 1973; Fulero & 
Delara, 1976: Jones & Aronson, 1973), possible limitations 
of either model's ability to predict observer perceptions of 
victims of personal misfortunes have not been investigated 
adequately. Three dimensions or factors which are expected 
to have critical importance to the cognitive operations pre­
dicted by the models are: (1) personal similarity—the degree 
to which observers perceive the victim as personally similar or 
dissimilar (the basis for perceived similarity can be due to 
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a variety of dimensions, such as sex, age, and personal 
values) to themselves; (2) situational relevance—the degree 
to which the situation is perceived to be personally meaning­
ful to observers (i.e., that they may someday encounter the 
same or a similar experience); and (3) severity of the out­
come—the extent to which observers perceive the consequences 
of the misfortune experienced by the victim as serious or 
important. The conceptual relevance of these three dimen­
sions and their relative importance to each model in affect­
ing how the misfortunes of others are perceived are summarized 
below. 
Personal similarity. Because people identify more read­
ily with an individual who is personally similar than with 
one who is personally dissimilar, the reasons attributed 
explaining a personally similar other's personal misfor­
tune are not likely to be the same as those indicated 
for a personally dissimilar other who experiences the same 
misfortune. 
In the defensive attribution model, the nature of the 
self-protective attributional set invoked to explain another1s 
personal misfortune depends on the degree to which observers 
perceive that other as personally similar or dissimilar. When 
the stimulus person is perceived as personally similar by 
observers, the model predicts they will adopt a "blame-
avoidance" attributional set and will avoid making attributions 
that blame the stimulus person for the incident. When the 
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stimulus person is perceived as personally dissimilar, the 
model predicts observers will adopt a "harm-avoidance" attri-
butional set and perceive the stimulus person as responsible 
forher/fois fate. It is also expected that observers will 
attempt to differentiate themselves from a dissimilar stimulus 
person as much as possible. 
Personal similarity in the just world model relates 
to observers' expectations of "deservedness"—that similar 
others should act like them and receive the same outcomes. 
When a similar other is victimized, the fact of that event is 
inconsistent with the expectation that a similar other would 
not be, or does not deserve to be, victimized. The degree 
to which observers identify with a stimulus person may then 
mediate the perception that the individual "got what she/he 
deserved." Incidents involving stimulus persons perceived as 
personally dissimilar are more easily justified because assess­
ments of what the stimulus person received can be evaluated 
against a standard of what most people in the same situation 
as the dissimilar person "deserve" to receive. For a stimu­
lus person who is personally similar, such assessments are 
more difficult to make because the standard by which observ­
ers evaluate the stimulus person also represents how they 
themselves would expect to be evaluated should they become 
involved in a similar situation. Thus, the consequences of a 
personal misfortune involving a personally similar other are 
often perceived quite critically, particularly when the 
"outcome-deservedness" relation is very discrepant. 
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In sum, according to both models, the degree to which 
observers identify with the victim greatly influences 
observers' perception of an individual1s role as a victim 
of personal misfortune. The models differ, however, in the 
way personal similarity is assumed to be related to perceived 
responsibility. For the defensive attribution model, per­
sonal similarity serves a discriminating function for assign­
ing responsibility, whereas for the just model, personal 
similarity serves an information function with which a 
judgment of "deservedness" can be determined. 
Situational relevance. To the extent a situation is 
perceived as relevant to observers, it should represent a more 
realistic situation and affect observers' view of a personal 
misfortune. 
According to the defensive attribution model, situational 
relevance is determined by the subjective probability on the 
part of observers that they might encounter the same or sim­
ilar outcome experienced by a victim of some personal mis­
fortune. Situational relevance is a necessary condition for 
optimal prediction by the model; self-protective attributions 
will occur only if the outcome of a given incident is per­
ceived as situationally relevant to observers. If the situa­
tion is not relevant, the model presumes observers are not 
adequately involved (to invoke self-protective attributions) 
and will not be able to make an unambiguous evaluation of the 
incident. 
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In the just world model, threats to a belief in a "just 
world" do not need to occur in situations that may actually 
involve observers. While the admission that a given mis­
fortune could happen to them may increase its potential as a 
personally threatening event, the relevance of the situation 
is important only if it increases observers' ability to eval­
uate what the victim "deserved" to receive and if the outcome 
of the incident has some impact on their trust in the "just­
ness" of their world. Consequently, even events which have 
little actual personal threat, if they threaten perceptions 
of "deservedness", can produce "just world" determinations. 
In sum, according to both models, the degree of personal 
meaningfulness or relevance of a given situation affects 
whether the event in question has personal meaning or rele­
vance to observers. For the defensive attribution model, the 
extent to which the situation is relevant or not relevant is 
critical to the expectations of the model. Situations which 
have little relevance to observers are not expected to pro­
duce adequate threat to observers1 sense of "being able to 
avoid the same unfortunate outcome." For the just world model, 
the relevance of the situation serves an information function 
indicating whether or not the incident in question poses a 
threat to observers' belief in a just world: situations of 
personally low relevance can threaten just world beliefs if 
the victim is perceived as not getting what she/he "deserved." 
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Severity of the outcome. According to the defensive 
attribution model, the severity of the outcome of an incident 
affects the extent to which it threatens observers' sense of 
well being and feelings of security. Incidents involving 
serious negative outcomes are more personally threatening to 
observers than incidents involving less serious or mild nega­
tive outcomes. Greater personal threat produces the tendency 
to intensify self-protective motivations and in turn the ten­
dency to invoke "blame-" and "harm-avoidance" attributions. 
In terms of the just world model, the severity of the 
outcome of some misfortune experienced by an individual is 
important (because of its potential as a threat to the belief 
in a "just world") if the magnitude of the outcome fails to 
match what the individual "deserves" to receive. Consequently, 
the greater the discrepancy between what an individual "de­
serves" to receive and what she/he actually does receive 
the greater the threat that perceived injustice is to observ­
ers' belief that the world is "just." Outcomes which repre­
sent only small discrepancies between what is perceived to be 
"deserved" and received pose minimal or no threat to the 
belief in a "just world." 
In sum, the severity of what happens to the victim 
serves a moderating function for both models. According to 
the defensive attribution model, the extent to which observ­
ers make defensive attributions is dependent on the severity 
of the outcome. Self-protective attributions are positively 
41 
related to outcome severity. For the just world model, the 
severity of the outcome of an incident provides critical 
information concerning whether the outcome was"deserved" or 
not. When the. outcomes are not perceived as "deserved," just 
world rationalizing is expected. 
Responsibility Measures 
Before proceeding to the specific predictions made by 
each model, it is necessary to consider the classes of depen­
dent measures by which differences in predictions made by the 
models can be compared. Among the classes of measures which 
are most relevant to a comparison of the models are measures 
of: (1) behavioral responsibility attributions, (2) charac-
terological responsibility attributions, and (3) nonpersonal 
responsibility attributions. 
Attributions of behavioral responsibility represent the 
extent to which the stimulus person is perceived responsible 
for a personal misfortune due to something she/he did or 
failed to do. Assessments of victim blame, victim fault, and 
victim-responsibility are examples of measures of behavioral 
responsibility attributions. 
Attributions of characterological responsibility repre­
sent the extent to which the stimulus person is perceived 
responsible for a personal misfortune due to something about 
her/his personality or personal character. Assessments of 
personal derogation in which the victim's personal character 
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is denigrated and viewed as blameworthy and assessments of 
respectability and personal worth are examples of measures 
of characterological responsibility attributions. 
Attributions of nonpersonal responsibility represent 
the extent to which the stimulus person is perceived as not 
personally responsible for a given mishap. Recommendations 
of victim compensation (e.g., offender blame and recommenda­
tions of offender punishment) and assessments of nonpersonal 
responsibility (e.g., evaluations of the incident being due 
to chance or the environment) are examples of nonpersonal 
responsibility attributions. 
Perceptions of a Personal Victimization: 
Predictions of the Models 
To test predictions made by the defensive attribution 
and just world models college students1 perceptions of a per­
sonal victimization were assessed by comparing their evalua­
tions (via attribution measures) of written case accounts 
describing a sexual assault perpetrated by a male assailant 
against a female victim. Comparative perceptions were obtained 
as a result of the manipulation of three major aspects of the 
incidents: (1) the relative relevance of the situation to 
the student observers, (2) the relative personal similarity 
of the stimulus person (victim) to the student observer, and 
(3) the magnitude or severity of the outcome of the incident 
to the victim. The situational aspect was varied along a 
dimension of personal involvement in the activity (walking 
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alone early in the evening, waiting alone for a bus early in 
the morning, going to a night club alone), so that the least 
engaged-in activity, going to a nightclub, was also the least 
relevant situation to subject-observers. The personal simi­
larity aspect involved portraying the victim in a social role 
(either as a college student, a stock clerk, or a strip-tease 
dancer) which varied between relatively very similar (a col­
lege student) to relatively very dissimilar (a strip-tease 
dancer). The severity of the outcome was manipulated by 
depicting the assault either as a rape (high severe outcome) 
or as an attempted rape (low severe outcome). The manipula­
tion of these three aspects or factors resulted in a 3 x 3 x 2 
between-groups design. Specific predictions were tested by 
comparing the relative magnitude of each attribution measure 
and by the overall pattern of the various classes of attribu­
tion measures with the theoretical discrepancy-resolution 
process identified by each model. 
Defensive attribution. According to the defensive attri­
bution model, for conditions of low or no situational rele­
vance, the class or classes of self-protective attributions 
which are most likely to be invoked to explain a personal mis­
fortune is not easily discerned; consequently all three classes 
of responsibility attributions are equally likely to be used as 
explanations for the victim's fate. However, when a situation 
has sufficient relevance for observers, the relative probabil­
ity of the three classes of responsibility attributions 
becomes more predictable. 
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1. Under conditions of high personal similarity/high 
situational relevance, attributions of nonpersonal responsi­
bility are predicted as the most likely way observers will 
explain a personal misfortune of a similar other. To a 
lesser extent, attributions of behavioral responsibility may 
also be assigned. Attributions of characterological respon­
sibility are the least likely of the three classes of respon­
sibility attributions to be used to explain a victim's mis­
fortune when it involves a similar other. Shaw and McMartin 
(1977) identified this attributional set as "blame-avoidance." 
2. Under conditions of low personal similarity/high 
situational relevance, the model predicts that attributions 
of behavioral responsibility and/or characterological respon­
sibility will be made to account for a victimization of a 
personally dissimilar other. To a lesser extent, attributions 
of nonpersonal responsibility may also be invoked to account 
for the victim's misfortune. Shaw and McMartin (1977) identi­
fied this attributional set as "harm-avoidance." 
3. The magnitude or severity of the outcome exper­
ienced by the victim is expected to affect the intensity with 
which observers will make responsibility attributions. As 
the severity of the outcome increases, the tendency of 
observers to invoke either a "blame-avoidance" or "harm-
avoidance" attributional set to explain the victimization 
is predicted to increase. 
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Just world. According to the just world model, situa­
tional relevance (that the observer may someday encounter 
the situation) is not absolutely necessary for just world 
determinations: the relevance of a situation is expected to 
act largely as a moderator variable. The more relevant 
observers perceive a situation to be, the better able they 
are to determine if a given incident poses a threat to their 
belief that the world is "just." Thus, even for incidents 
which occur in situations which are perceived as having 
little probability of happening to observers, if they are 
perceived as posing threats to the belief in a "just world," 
just world determinations are predicted. 
1. Under conditions of high personal similarity/high 
situational relevance and high personal similarity/low situa­
tional relevance, justification of personal victimizations 
is most likely to involve attributions of nonpersonal respon­
sibility and to a lesser extent behavioral responsibility 
attributions. Attributions of characterological responsi­
bility are expected to be the least likely form of justifica­
tion used to explain a similar other's personal misfortune. 
2. Under conditions of low personal similarity/high 
situational relevance and low personal similarity/low situa­
tional relevance, justification of personal victimizations 
is most likely to involve attributions of behavioral respon­
sibility, and to a lesser extent characterological responsi­
bility may also be invoked. Attributions of nonpersonal 
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responsibility may also be invoked, although their use is 
relatively less likely than the other two classes of attri­
butions . 
The magnitude or severity of the outcome experienced by 
the victim is expected to be positively related to determina­
tions of "deservedness" and thus is expected to be strongly 
related to the incidence and degree of responsibility attri­
butions . 
3. Under conditions of mild outcome/low personal sim­
ilarity/high situational relevance and mild outcome/low 
personal similarity/low situational relevance, attributions 
of behavioral responsibility and characterological responsi­
bility are predicted as the most likely ways to justify a 
personal victimization of a dissimilar other; relatively less 
likely are attributions of nonpersonal responsibility. 
4. Under conditions of mild outcome/high personal 
similarity/high situational relevance and mild outcome/high 
personal similarity/low situational relevance, the model 
predicts that attributions of nonpersonal responsibility and 
to a lesser extent behavioral responsibility attributions 
are the most likely ways a victimization of a similar other 
will be justified. Attributions of characterological respon­
sibility are less likely to be used to account for a victim­
ization of a similar other. 
5. Under conditions of severe outcome/low personal 
similarity/high situational relevance and severe outcome/low 
47 
personal similarity/low situational relevance, the model 
predicts that attributions of behavioral responsibility and 
characterological responsibility are the most likely ways a 
victimization of a personally dissimilar other will be jus­
tified. Attributions of nonpersonal responsibility are 
expected to a much lesser degree. 
6. Under conditions of severe outcome/high personal 
similarity/high situational relevance and severe outcome/high 
personal similarity/low situational relevance, justification 
of a personal victimization is expected to involve high levels 
of behavioral responsibility and nonpersonal responsibility 
attributions. Characterological responsibility attributions 
may also be used, but relatively less so than the other 
classes of attributions. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the present study was to compare predic­
tions made by two victim perception models, defensive attri­
bution and just world. The two models make contrasting pre­
dictions regarding the same phenomena on the basis of the 
cognitive-perceptual organization of an event presumed by 
each model to be invoked when people confront the personal 
misfortune of another. Predictions of the two models are 
made in regards to three major aspects of events comprising 
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personal misfortunes—the relevance of the situation to the 
observer, the personal similarity of the victim to the 
observer, and the severity of the outcome experienced by 
the victim. 
The defensive attribution model argues that people pre­
fer to believe that the personal misfortunes of others are 
not likely to occur to them. That is, they either will not 
experience the same unfortunate fate, or if they do, the fact 
of their involvement will not be their fault. To assure 
themselves of avoiding the mishap or being blamed for it 
should it happen to them, the model posits that people will 
invoke self-protective defensive attributions based on the 
situational relevance of the incident, the victim's personal 
similarity to them, and the severity of the outcome of the 
incident for the victim. The effects of these aspects on 
perceptions of a personal misfortune are that the situation 
must be perceived as relevant before defensive attributions 
are made. The degree of personal similarity the victim shares 
with observers affects whether or not the observers will 
blame the victim for her/his involvement. The severity 
of the outcome moderates the strength of the predicted 
defensive attributions. The major effects predicted by 
the defensive attribution model are main effects for sit­
uational relevance and personal similarity, and the inter­
actions situational relevance x personal similarity and sit­
uational relevance x personal similarity x severity of out­
come. 
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The just world model contends that perceptions of the 
personal misfortunes of others are evaluated on the basis 
of whether or not the victim "got what she/he deserved." 
The major assumption of the model is that the world is a 
just and orderly place and people get what they deserve. 
Apparent contradictions to this relationship cause the need 
to explain or resolve the perceived injustice. People main­
tain their belief in a just world by rationalizing another's 
personal misfortune to be either sufficiently deserved or 
adequately compensated. In either case, the perception of a 
personal misfortune, and in particular, the role of the vic­
tim, may be altered drastically in order that the incident 
will be consonant with the belief that the world is just. 
Whether what has happened to a victim represents a sufficient 
threat to observers1 belief in a just world depends on the 
situation, who the victim is, and what outcome the victim 
experiences. Personal identification with the victim and 
the situation provides a basis by which observers can eval­
uate expected outcomes. Outcomes which are not expected are 
the most threatening to the belief in a just world and 
require the most justification. The major effects predicted 
by the just world model are main effects for personal similar­
ity and severity of outcome, and interaction effects of 
personal similarity x severity of outcome and personal 
similarity x situational relevance x severity of outcome. 
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In brief, the two models both predict a main effect of 
personal similarity and a three-way interaction of personal 
similarity x situational relevance x severity of outcome. 
Each model also makes predictions regarding effects not made 
by the other model. Defensive attribution predicts a main 
effect of situational relevance and an interaction of situa­
tional relevance x personal similarity. Just world predicts 
a main effect of severity of outcome and an interaction of 
personal similarity x severity of outcome. On the basis of 
these predictions, the results of the present study were 
evaluated as support for one, both, or neither of the models. 
Determination of the general adequacy of either model was 
made by assessing individual predicted effects and the over­





Two hundred and seventy-five female students enrolled 
in introductory level psychology classes at the University 
of North Carolina-Greensboro, during the Fall semester, 
1980, participated in the study for course credit. 
Design 
Predictions made by the just world and defensive attri­
bution models were compared by presenting subjects a written 
case account describing a personal victimization of a female 
in which the personal similarity of the stimulus person rela­
tive to the subjects, the relevance of the situation to the 
subjects, and the severity of the outcome involving the 
stimulus person (the victim) were manipulated. Three social 
roles representing high, moderate, and low personal similar­
ity, three social settings, representing high relevant-high 
probability of subject involvement, low relevant-moderate 
probability of subject involvement, and low relevant-low 
probability of subject involvement, and two levels of personal 
harm suffered by the victim representing low severe and high 
severe outcomes were manipulated in a 3 x 3 x 2 between-
groups design. 
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Since the primary case account involved a sexual vic­
timization which may be considered unique to female victims, 
a second case account involving a victimization of a male 
was presented to subjects in order to extend the generaliza-
bility of the results. The stimulus situation portrayed a 
male, who during the course of a robbery, was physically 
assaulted. Manipulation of the victim's social respectabil­
ity, the social setting, and the consequences of the incident 
for the victim yielded a 3 x 3 x 2 between-groups design. 
The first factor, social respectability, involved three 
levels, high, moderate, and low. Pretesting indicated that 
although females generally tended to identify with a stim­
ulus person's social role regardless of the sex of the person, 
female subjects could not be expected to reliably identify 
with social roles of persons of the opposite sex. Thus, to 
ensure that the social roles of the stimulus persons por­
trayed in the male victimization incidents provided differ­
ent levels of observer identification, the roles were selected 
on the basis of social respectability rather than personal 
similarity.^" The second factor, social setting, was altered 
to represent three social contexts, representing high rele­
vant-high probability of subject involvement, low relevant-
moderate probability of subject involvement, and low rele­
vant-low probability of subject involvement. The third and 
last factor, the outcome of the incident, was portrayed 
either as a low severe or high severe outcome for the victim. 
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Subjects were presented two personal victimization case 
accounts, one involving a female and one involving a male 
victim. The order of presentation of the two cases was 
held constant: the female victimization incident was always 
presented first. This order was followed so that the eval­
uations of the female victimization incident (the primary 
stimulus situation) would not be affected (i.e., confounded 
due to a contrast effect; see Pepitone & DiNubile, 1976) 
by exposure to a case involving a victimization of a male 
2 stimulus person. The magnitude or severity of the outcome 
of the incidents was also held constant: subjects were pre­
sented two cases in which the consequences for the victims 
in both cases represented either low severe or high severe 
outcomes. The social setting of the incidents was counter­
balanced so that each social setting involving a female vic­
tim preceded each of the male victimization social settings 
an equal number of times. 
Stimulus Materials 
Development of the stimulus materials. The development 
of the stimulus materials involved the construction of case 
accounts of personal victimizations that (a) included the 
three stimulus conditions identified as conceptually rele­
vant to both models and (b) represented stimulus conditions 
which could be manipulated along the desired dimensions of 
personal similarity, situational relevance, and severity of 
outcome. These requirements were met: (1) by differentiating 
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the degree of personal similarity of the stimulus person 
with that of the subjects by the use of different social 
roles, (2) by altering the relevance of the situation to 
subjects by portraying the victimization in different social 
settings, and (3) by manipulating the severity of the out­
come to the stimulus person by increasing the severity of 
the personal harm suffered by that individual. Selection of 
the stimulus materials was made on the basis of pretesting 
selected social roles, social settings, and personal outcomes 
identified from past empirical research that examined the 
perception of the victimization of others. The two victim­
ization incidents, a sexual assault of a female and a physi­
cal assault of a male, were selected because of their use in 
previous research involving perceptions of victimizations. 
Pretesting of the stimulus materials. Pretesting of 
the stimulus materials was designed to identify social roles, 
social settings, and personal outcomes that could be included 
in case accounts depicting a sexual assault of a female and 
a physical assault of a male. Inclusion and refinement of 
the set of stimulus materials used to compare predictions 
made by the two models were based on ratings made by several 
panels of raters made up of students enrolled in introductory 
level courses in psychology, mathematics, and business during 
the stammer session, 1980. Pretesting of the stimulus mater­
ials included: (a) rating a list of social roles on the 
basis of perceived personal similarity to each role, 
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(b) rating a list of social settings for perceived relevance 
or likelihood of possible involvement, and (c) rating a list 
of personal outcomes in terms of personal suffering. From 
the results of these ratings, several stimulus situations 
were constructed representing combinations of high/low per­
sonal similarity, high/low situational relevance, and high/ 
low severity of outcome conditions. These stimulus situa­
tions were then evaluated by a panel of raters (see Appen­
dix A for the results of the panel's ratings). From these 
results, the final stimulus materials were constructed 
(examples of the stimulus situations are presented in Appen­
dix B). For the case accounts of the victimization of the 
female stimulus person, the stimulus situations portrayed a 
personal victimization of either a strip-tease dancer (low 
personal similarity), a stock clerk (moderate personal sim­
ilarity), or a college student (high personal similarity), 
who was either walking alone early in the evening (high rele­
vant-high probability of subject involvement social setting), 
waiting alone in the morning for a bus (low relevant-moderate 
probability of subject involvement), or going alone in the 
evening to a night club (low relevant-low probability of 
subject involvement), and who suffers a rape (high severe 
outcome) or an attempted rape (low severe outcome). For the 
case accounts of the victimization of the male stimulus per­
son, the stimulus situations portrayed a personal victimiza­
tion of either a professional gambler (lew social 
56 
respectability), a car mechanic (moderate social respect­
ability), or a college student (high social respectability), 
who was either walking alone early in the evening (high 
relevant-high probability of subject involvement social set­
ting) , waiting alone in the morning for a bus (low relevant-
moderate probability of subject involvement social setting), 
or going alone to a bar (low relevant-moderate probability 
of subject involvement social setting), and who suffers a 
serious physical assault (high severe outcome) or a less 
serious physical assault (low severe outcome). 
Dependent Measures 
After each case account, subjects were asked to indicate 
their perceptions of the victimization incident on a set of 
7-point rating scales. These scales represented the extent 
to which subjects: 
(1) perceived themselves as similar to the victim 
("victim similarity") 
(2) identified with what happened to the victim ("iden­
tification with the victim's misfortune") 
(3) believed the same kind of misfortune that happened 
to the victim could happen to them ("likelihood of 
experiencing same fate") 
(4) believed the victim got what she/he deserved ("vic­
tim deserved the outcome") 
(5) felt the victim was to blame for the incident ("vic­
tim blame") 
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(6) felt the offender was to blame for the incident 
("offender blame") 
(7) felt the victim's involvement in the incident was 
her/his fault ("victim fault") 
(8) considered the victim's misfortune as serious 
("seriousness of the incident") 
(9) viewed the victim as respectable ("victim respect­
ability" ) 
(10) recommended the offender (if perceived responsible) 
be punished ("offender punishment"). 
In an open-ended question, subjects were asked to indicate 
if they thought the victim was in some way responsible for 
the victimization incident, and if so, in what way or ways 
was she/he responsible. A listing of the questions and 
rating scales is presented in Appendix C. 
Procedure 
Along with the case accounts, several questionnaires 
representing two personality measures, a behavioral inventory 
of risk situations, and a reliability check on the personal 
3 similarity manipulation were compiled into stimulus.material 
booklets. A set of written general instructions for comple­
tion of the booklet and specific instructions for each ques­
tionnaire were included in the booklet. A reproduction of 
the cover page and general instructions is provided in 
Appendix D. 
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Subjects were recruited by volunteer sign-up sheets 
4 and run in mixed sex groups varying in size from 1 to 25. 
Subjects were given a brief explanation regarding their 
participation (i.e., that they would be filling out some 
questionnaires) and were then asked to complete the stimulus 
materials booklet. Distribution of the stimulus materials 
booklet was random. Following completion of the booklet, 
subjects were thoroughly debriefed. 
Data Analysis 
Between-group (3x3x2) analyses were conducted sep­
arately for the ratings of the female and male victimization 
stimulus situations. This procedure produced 18 cells per 
stimulus situation with 15 subjects per cell. Data from five 
subjects were excluded because they failed to complete ratings 
for all dependent measures for the two stimulus situations. 
Replacement data were collected through recruitment of five 
additional subjects. 
The data were analyzed using multivariate (MANOVA) and 
univariate (ANOVA) analysis of variance procedures. For 
purposes of determining differences among sets of dependent 
variables, groupings of conceptually similar measures were 
identified by three independent judges. This procedure pro­
duced three sets of variables: (1) Identification with the 
Victimization ("victim similarity," "identification with the 
victim's misfortune," and "likelihood of experiencing the 
59 
same fate"), (2) Victim Responsibility ("victim deserved the 
outcome," "victim blame," "offender blame," "victim fault," 
and "victim respectability"), and (3) Severity of the Inci­
dent ("seriousness of the incident" and "recommended punish­
ment"). Average percentage of agreement between raters 
exceeded .80. Individual ratings by judges are presented 
in Appendix E. Empirical consensus for the three variable 
sets was provided by separate factor analyses of the ratings 
of the 10 dependent measures representing the female and 
male victimization stimulus situations, respectively. For 
both sets of dependent variables, the analyses produced iden­
tical factor patterns (see Appendix F) and showed close 
agreement with the groupings identified by the three judges. 
MANOVAS were computed on the three sets of dependent 
variables identified by the raters and factor analyses of 
subjects' ratings of the variables. Canonical correlations 
5 for each multivariate effect were also computed. ANOVAS 
were conducted for each dependent variable to test for sig­
nificant univariate effects. Post hoc comparisons for sig­
nificant simple effects were tested via the Scheffe/proced­
ure. This series of analyses was conducted separately for 
the ratings of the female and male victimization stimulus 
situations. 
Results of subjects' ratings of perceived personal sim­
ilarity of the male and female stimulus roles are presented 
in Appendix G, Table 1. 
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Organization of the Results 
g 
The results of the analyses of the female and male 
stimulus situations are presented in separate sections. For 
the female and male stimulus situations, respectively, the 
results are organized into subsections by dependent variable 
set: (1) Identification with the Victimization, (2) Victim 
Respectability, and (3) Severity of the Incident. Within 
each subsection the order of presentation of results is as 
follows: 
1. Statement of all significant multivariate compari­
sons . 
7 2. Statement of all significant univariate comparisons. 
3. Presentation of post hoc assessments of all signifi­
cant univariate effects. 
4. Mean ratings for all effects for the female victim­
ization incidents are presented in Tables 2 to 4 in 
Appendix H. 
5. Mean ratings for all effects for the male victimiza­





Victimization of a Female 
Identification with the Victimization. The results 
of a MANOVA performed on ratings of the set of variables 
representing the Identification with the Victimization 
("victim similarity," "identification with the victim's mis­
fortune," and "likelihood of experiencing a similar fate") 
identified significant multivariate effects for the situa­
tional relevance x severity of outcome interaction, 
F (6, 502) = 2.84, £><.01, and for the main effect of 
personal similarity, F (6, 502) = 9.99, £<.0001. 
Victim similarity. Results of an ANOVA involving 
ratings of perceived similarity of the victim to subjects 
revealed that only the main effect of personal similarity 
was significant, F (2, 252) = 26.04, £<.0001, U.I.. = .16. 
College student victims were perceived as significantly more 
personally similar than stock clerk (£<.005) and strip-tease 
dancer (£< .001) victims. Stock clerk victims were also 
perceived as significantly more similar than strip-tease 
dancer victims (£< .005). Mean ratings for "victim similar­
ity" are presented in Table 2. 
Identification with the victim's misfortune. The 
results of an ANOVA comparing the extent to which subjects 
62 
identified with the victim's experience indicated that the 
only significant difference was the main effect, severity of 
outcome, F (1, 252) = 5.06, p< .03, U._I. = .01. Mean ratings 
for this effect are presented in Table 2. Subjects identi­
fied more with a victim's misfortune when it was portrayed 
as a rape than when it was portrayed as an attempted rape. 
Likelihood of experiencing a similar fate. An ANOVA 
conducted on subjects' ratings of the likelihood of their 
experiencing a fate similar to that of the victim yielded a 
significant situational relevance x severity of outcome 
interaction, F (2, 252) = 3.76, £<.03, U._I. = .02, and a 
main effect of personal similarity, F (2, 252) = 10.36, 
£< .0001, U._I. = .06. Mean ratings of these effects are 
presented in Table 2. Post hoc comparisons for the simple 
main effects of the situational relevance x severity of out­
come interaction revealed that when the incident occurred 
while the victim was going to a night club and the outcome 
was a rape, subjects rated the experience as significantly 
more likely to happen to them than when the setting was the 
same but the outcome was an attempted rape (£<.025). Sub­
jects also perceived greater likelihood of being a victim 
of an attempted rape when it was portrayed as occurring in 
the night club setting than when the setting depicted the 
victim either walking along alone (£<.025) or waiting alone 
for a bus te< .025). In terms of the effect of personal 
similarity, post hoc assessments indicated that subjects 
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perceived the likelihood of what happened to the victim as 
significantly more likely to happen to them when the victim 
was a college student or a stock clerk than when the victim 
was identified as a strip-tease dancer (£< .001 and £<.005, 
respectively). 
Victim Responsibility. The results of a MANOVA performed 
on ratings of the set of variables representing Victim Respon­
sibility ("victim deserved outcome," "victim blame," "victim 
fault," "victim respectability," and "offender blame") iden­
tified significant multivariate effects for the interaction 
of situational relevance x severity of outcome, F (10, 498) = 
2.33, £<.02, and for the main effects of personal similar­
ity, F (10, 498) = 15.17, £<.0001, and situational relevance, 
F (10, 498) = 2.67, £<.004. 
Victim deserved outcome. An ANOVA conducted to com­
pare ratings of the extent to which subjects felt the victim 
deserved the outcome found only the main effect of personal 
similarity yielded a significant difference, F (2, 252) = 9.05, 
E< .0002, U._I. = .06. Subjects perceived strip-tease dancer 
victims as significantly more deserving of their fates than 
either college .005) or stock clerk <E< .005) victims. 
Mean ratings of this measure by victim stimulus role are pre­
sented in Table 3. 
Victim blame. The results of an ANOVA performed to 
identify differences in the extent subjects blamed the victim 
indicated that significant differences for the interactions of 
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personal similarity x severity of outcome, F (2, 252) = 3.58, 
£< .03, U.JE. = .02, situational relevance x severity of out­
come, F (2, 252) = 6.48, £<.002, U.^I. = .04, and for the 
main effect of personal similarity, F (2, 252) = 6.96, 
£<.002, U._I• = .04. Mean ratings for these effects are 
presented in Table 3. Post hoc comparisons of the simple 
main effects for the personal similarity x severity of out­
come interaction indicated that when the outcome involved 
an attempted rape, strip-tease dancer victims were blamed 
more for their fates than when the outcome was identified as 
a rape (£<.025). The analysis also found that when the 
outcome was portrayed as an attempted rape, strip-tease 
dancer victims were assigned significantly more blame for 
their victimizations than either college student (£<.001) 
or stock clerk (£<.025) victims. Assessment of the simple 
main effects of the situational relevance x severity of out­
come interaction revealed that when victims suffered an 
attempted rape while going to a night club, they were rated 
as significantly more to blame for that outcome than if the 
outcome was more severe—rape (£<.001). Victims who exper­
ienced an attempted rape while on their way to a night club 
were perceived as significantly more to blame for what hap­
pened to them than were victims portrayed in the walking 
along alone <E< .005) or waiting alone for a bus .005) 
settings. For the main effect of personal similarity, vic­
tims identified as strip-tease dancers were assigned 
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significantly more blame for their victimizations than were 
stock clerk .005) or college student (£< .01) victims. 
Victim fault. An ANOVA involving a comparison of 
ratings of attributions of victim fault found significant 
effects for situational relevance x severity of outcome inter­
action, F (2, 252) = 5.92, £<.004, U._I. = .03, personal 
similarity, F (2, 252) = 4.59, £<.02, U.,1. = .03, and 
situational relevance, F (2, 252) = 14.02, p<.03, U.,1. = .14, 
Mean ratings for these effects are presented in Table 3. 
Post hoc comparisons of the situational relevance x severity 
of outcome interaction revealed that subjects perceived the 
occurrence of an attempted rape as significantly more due 
to chance (as opposed to being the victim's fault) when the 
victim was walking along alone (E< .001) or waiting alone 
for a bus te< .001) than when the victim was portrayed as 
going to a night club. Subjects also rated victimizations 
which occurred in the night club setting as due significantly 
more to chance factors when the outcome was a rape than when 
it involved an attempted rape <E< .001). Comparison of 
attributions of victim fault by victim role indicated that 
subjects perceived the victimizations of the stock clerk and 
the college student victims as due significantly more to 
chance factors (JD< .025 and £< .10, respectively) than 
ones involving strip-tease dancer victims. For the effect 
of relevance of the setting, subjects rated victimizations 
which occurred while the victim was walking along alone or 
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waiting alone for a bus as due significantly more to chance 
than victimizations which occurred while the victim was going 
alone to a night club (£<.05). 
Victim respectability. An ANOVA assessing subjects' 
evaluations of the victims1 respectability revealed signif­
icant differences for the situational relevance x severity 
of outcome interaction, F (2, 252) = 3.12, £<.05, U.,1. = .01, 
and for the main effects of personal similarity, F (2, 252) = 
103.47, £<.0001, U._I. = .41, and situational relevance, 
F (2, 252) = 10.38, £<.0001, U.JC. = .04. Mean ratings for 
these effects are presented in Table 3. Post hoc assessment 
of the simple main effects of the situational relevance 
x severity of outcome interaction revealed that victims vdio 
suffered an attempted rape were perceived as significantly 
more respectable when the incident was presented as occurring 
either in the walking along alone or waiting alone for a bus 
settings, than in the going to a night club setting (£<.001). 
When the setting of the incident involved going alone to a 
night club, subjects perceived victims of rape as signifi­
cantly more respectable than victims of attempted rape 
(£<.025). Comparisons of mean ratings of victim respect­
ability as a function of victim role indicated that subjects 
rated the strip-tease dancer victims as significantly less 
respectable than either the college student or stock clerk 
victims (p< .001). Post hoc assessments of the effect of 
the relevance of the setting revealed that victims of 
67 
incidents portrayed as occurring in the night club setting 
were perceived as significantly less respectable than vic­
tims assaulted in either the walking along alone or waiting 
alone for a bus settings (JD<.001). 
Offender blame. Results of an ANOVA conducted on 
ratings of "offender blame" identified significant differ­
ences among the main effects of personal similarity, 
F (2, 252) = 3.39, £<.04, U.I.. = .02, and severity of out­
come, F (1, 252) = 5.61, £><.02, U.^* = .01. Mean ratings 
for these effects are presented in Table 3. Comparisons of 
offender blame by victim role revealed that subjects per­
ceived the offender as significantly less culpable when the 
victim was a strip-tease dancer than when the victim was 
either a college student or a stock clerk (E< .10). For the 
effect of severity of outcome, offenders were assigned 
greater blame when the incident resulted in a rape than when 
the assault against the victim was an attempted rape <E< .02, 
F-test). 
Severity of the Incident. The results of a MANOVA per­
formed on the ratings of the set of variables representing 
Severity of the Incident ("seriousness of the incident" 
and "offender punishment") identified significant multivar­
iate effects for the interaction of personal similarity x 
severity of outcome, F (4, 504) = 3.00, £< .02, and the main 
effect of severity of outcome, F (2, 251) = 31.36, .0001. 
Seriousness of the incident. An ANOVA computed on 
the ratings of the seriousness of the victimizations involving 
68 
a female found significant differences for the interaction of 
personal similarity x severity of outcome, P (2, 252) = 5.96, 
£<.003, U.,1. = .03, and for the main effect of severity of 
outcome, F (1, 252) = 45.23, £<.0001, U.,1. = .14. Mean 
ratings for these effects are presented in Table 4. Compar­
isons of the means for the simple main effects for the per­
sonal similarity x severity of outcome interaction indicated 
that then the outcome was an attempted rape, subjects per­
ceived the incident as more serious for college student vic­
tims than stock clerk victims .005). Victimizations 
involving all three victim roles were rated as significantly 
more serious when the outcome was a rape than when it was 
described as an attempted rape (stock clerk and dancer vic­
tims, £<.001, student victims, £<.10). Overall, rape 
victimizations were evaluated as significantly more serious 
than attempted rape victimizations .001, F-test). 
Offender punishment. The results of an ANOVA compar­
ing subjects' recommendations of punishment for the offender 
of female victims yielded significant differences for the 
interaction, situational relevance x severity of outcome, 
F (2, 252) = 3.43, £< .04, U.,1. = .04, and for the main 
effect severity of outcome, F (2, 252) = 35.83, £<.0001, 
U._I. = .11. Mean ratings for these effects are presented 
in Table 4. Assessment of the simple main effects for the 
situational relevance x severity of outcome interaction 
revealed that when the outcome was an attempted rape, subjects 
69 
recommended significantly harsher prison sentences for vic­
timizations occurring in the waiting alone for a bus setting 
than for incidents presented as occurring in the walking 
along alone setting (£< .10). Subjects also recommended 
harsher prison sentences for rape victimizations than for 
attempted rape incidents .0001, F-test). 
Victimization of a Male 
Identification with the Victimization. The results of a 
MANOVA performed on ratings of the set of variables repre­
senting Identification with the Victimization ("victim sim­
ilarity," "identification with the victim's misfortune," 
and "likelihood of experiencing a similar fate") revealed 
significant main effects of personal similarity, F (6, 502) = 
3.68, £<.002, situational relevance, F (6, 502) = 5.32, 
£<.0001, and severity of outcome, F (3, 250) = 2.80, £<.04. 
Victim similarity. Results of an ANOVA involving 
ratings of perceived similarity of the victim revealed sig­
nificant main effects for personal similarity, F (2, 252) = 
6.16, £<.003, U. 1^. = .03, situational relevance, F (2, 252) = 
8.73, £ <.0002, U. 1^ = .05), and severity of outcome, 
F (1, 252) = 4.82, £<.03, U.I.. = .01. Mean ratings for 
these effects are presented in Table 5. Post hoc comparisons 
for the effect of personal similarity indicated that male 
student victims were perceived as significantly more per­
sonally similar than professional gambler victims (p<.005). 
Victims identified as car mechanics were also perceived as 
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significantly more personally similar than victims described 
as professional gamblers (£< .10). Post hoc comparisons of 
the ratings of victim similarity across the three settings 
revealed that victims going to a bar were perceived as less 
personally similar than victims attacked either waiting 
alone for a bus te< .001) or walking along alone (JD<.025). 
Comparison of ratings of victim similarity by severity of 
outcome showed that subjects rated male victims who suffered 
serious personal injury as significantly more personally 
similar than victims who were portrayed as experiencing only 
minor physical injury (£<.03, F-test). 
Identification with the victim's misfortune. The 
results of an ANOVA comparing the extent to which subjects 
identified with the victim's experience indicated that the 
only significant difference was the main effect of severity 
of outcome, F (1, 252) = 5.04, £><.03, U.,1. = .01. Mean 
ratings for this effect are presented in Table 5. Subjects 
indicated that they identified more with the victim's misfor­
tune when it involved a serious physical injury than when the 
victim was described as suffering only a minor physical 
injury. 
Likelihood of experiencing a similar fate. An ANOVA 
conducted on subjects' ratings of the likelihood of their 
experiencing a fate similar to that of the victim yielded 
main effects of personal similarity, F (2, 252) = 6.27, 
£<.003, U.I. = .03, situational relevance, F (2, 252) = 11.71, 
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£><.0001, U.I^ = .07, and severity of outcome, F (1, 252) = 
6.10, £<.02, U.I. = .01. Mean ratings for these effects 
are presented in Table 5. For the effect of personal sim­
ilarity, subjects perceived the victimization as signifi­
cantly more likely to happen to them when the victim was 
portrayed as either a car mechanic or a college student than 
when the victim was identified as a professional gambler 
<£< .001 and £<.10, respectively). For the situational 
relevance effect, post hoc comparisons of mean ratings indi­
cated that subjects were significantly more likely to admit 
that a similar victimization incident could happen to them 
when the setting involved walking along alone or waiting 
alone for a bus than when the setting was presented as going 
alone to a bar (£<.001 and £<.01, respectively). Subjects 
were also significantly more likely to perceive themselves 
as experiencing a similar fate when the outcome resulted 
in a serious physical injury than when it resulted in a less 
serious injury (F-test, £<.02). 
Victim Responsibility. The results of a MANOVA performed 
on ratings of the set of variables representing Victim Respon­
sibility ("victim deserved outcome," "victim blame," "victim 
fault," "victim respectability," and "offender blame") iden­
tified significant differences for the main effects of per­
sonal similarity, F (10, 498) = 7.69, £<.0001, and severity 
of outcome, F (5, 248) = 2.37, £<.04. 
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Victim deserved outcome. An ANOVA conducted to com­
pare ratings of the extent the victim deserved the outcome 
found that only the effect of personal similarity yielded 
significant differences, F (2, 252) = 15.60, £<.0001, 
U._I. = .10. Subjects perceived victims identified as profes­
sional gamblers as significantly more deserving of what 
happened to them than either the car mechanic (£< .001) or 
college student (£< .001) victims. Mean ratings for this 
effect are presented in Table 6. 
Victim blame. The results of an ANOVA performed to 
identify differences in the extent subjects blamed the 
victim indicated that only the main effect of personal simi­
larity, F (2, 252) = 5.49, £><.005, U.,1. = .03, produced 
significant differences. Mean ratings of subjects' assign­
ment of blame are presented in Table 6. Subjects attributed 
more blame to victims identified as professional gamblers 
than when they were presented either as car mechanics (£< .01) 
or college students (£<.025). 
Victim fault. No significant effects were found. 
Victim respectability. An ANOVA assessing subjects' 
evaluations of victim respectability identified significant 
differences for the main effects of personal similarity, 
F (2, 252) = 35.66, £<.0001, U.jC. = .20, and severity of 
outcome, F (1, 252) = 8.06, £<.005, U._I. = .02. Mean rat­
ings for these effects are presented in Table 6. Post hoc 
assessments of ratings of victim respectability by personal 
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similarity indicated that subjects perceived victims por­
trayed as professional gamblers as significantly less 
respectable than victims identified either as car mechanics 
or college students (£< .0001). Subjects also rated victims 
who suffered serious physical injury as result of being 
assaulted as significantly more respectable than victims 
who suffered only minor physical injury (£<.02, F-test). 
Offender blame. No significant effects were found. 
Severity of the Incident. The results of a MANOVA per­
formed on ratings of the set of variables representing 
Severity of the Incident ("seriousness of the incident" and 
"offender punishment") identified significant multivariate 
effects for the personal similarity x situational relevance 
interaction, F (8, 504) = 3.70, £<.0003, and for the main 
effect of severity of outcome, F (2, 251) = 6.48, £<.002. 
Seriousness of the incident. An ANOVA computed on 
the ratings of the seriousness of the victimizations involv­
ing a male found significant differences for the interaction 
of personal similarity x situational relevance, F (4, 252) = 
2.59, p<.04, U.I. = .03, and for the main effect of severity 
of outcome, F (1, 252) = 12.66, £<.0004, U.I.. = .04. Mean 
ratings for these effects are presented in Table 7. Post hoc 
comparisons of the simple main effects for the personal 
similarity x situational relevance interaction revealed only 
that the physical attack of car mechanic victims was per­
ceived as significantly more serious when the victims were 
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walking along alone than when the victims were portrayed 
as going to a bar (JD<.05). The main effect of severity of 
outcome indicated that victimizations which resulted in 
serious physical injury were viewed as significantly more 
serious than victimizations which resulted in only minor 
physical injury for the victim (£<.004, F-test). 
Offender punishment. The results of an ANOVA compar­
ing recommendations of punishment of male victims found only 
the personal similarity x situational relevance interaction 
produced significant differences, F (4, 252) = 4.17, JD.^.003, 
U.I^. = .05. Mean ratings for this effect are presented in 
Table 7. Post hoc comparisons of the simple main effects 
revealed only one significant difference; for victimizations 
occurring in the bus stop setting, subjects recommended 
harsher punishment for offenders of student victims than 




Support for the Just World and 
Defensive Attribution Models 
A summary of the results showing significant multivar­
iate and univariate effects for each dependent variable is 
presented in Table 8. The results which indicate support 
for the models are identified in Table 8 by a DA (defensive 
attribution) or JW (just world) superscript. 
Just world. From Table 8 it clearly can be seen that 
none of the results involving perceptions of a victimization 
of a female or a male support the just world model. Sub­
jects' evaluations of the victimization incidents did not 
coincide with the pattern of responsibility attributions 
predicted for the interaction effects of personal similarity 
x severity of the outcome and personal similarity x situa­
tional relevance x severity of the outcome. Contrary to 
predictions of the model, greater assignment of behavioral 
("victim blame") and/or characterological ("victim respect­
ability" ) responsibility did not occur as a function of an 
increase in the severity of the outcome for the victim. 
For example, subjects' ratings of the female victimizations 
indicated that victims of rape (the more severe personal 
outcome) were not assigned greater blame or perceived as less 
Table 8 
Summary of Significant Results Compared with Predictions of the 
Defensive Attribution and Just World Models 
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respectable than victims of attempted rape (the less severe 
personal outcome). A similar pattern was found for the eval­
uations of the male victimization incidents. Hence, contrary 
to the just world view, victims of the more severe personal 
outcomes were not assigned more personal responsibility. 
Defensive attribution. The results summarized in Table 8 
show only minor support for the defensive attribution model. 
In similar fashion to the just world model, none of the major 
attribution patterns predicted by the defensive attribution 
model were supported by subjects1 ratings of the victimiza­
tion incidents. For example, contrary to prediction, the 
situational relevance of the setting did not differentially 
affect subjects' evaluations of personally similar and per­
sonally dissimilar victims. For the predicted interaction, 
personal similarity x situational relevance, only two sets 
of ratings ("seriousness of the incident" and "offender pun­
ishment" for the male victimization incidents) revealed 
significant differences. Neither of these comparisons pro­
duced results in support of the defensive attribution model. 
Another key prediction which was not supported was the three-
way interaction of personal similarity x situational rele­
vance x severity of outcome. For this effect, the model 
predicted an increase in "harm-avoidance" (victim responsi­
bility) attributions when the victim was portrayed as person­
ally dissimilar and an increase in "blame-avoidance" 
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(nonvictim responsibility) attributions when the victim was 
portrayed as personally similar as the outcome became more 
severe (i.e., rape vs. attempted rape). Situational rele­
vance was expected to have the effect of creating appropriate 
conditions for the likelihood of defensive attributions; 
thus, under high situationally relevant conditions responsi­
bility attributions should follow patterns predicted by the 
model, but under low or ambiguous conditions of situational 
relevance, no clear pattern of attributions was predicted. 
No significant differences for this effect for either the 
female or the male victimization situations were found. 
Some limited support for the model is suggested by the 
results of the ratings of the Victim Responsibility measures 
as a function of the personal similarity of the victim. For 
incidents involving a victimization of a female, subjects 
were inclined to perceive victims of low similarity (strip­
tease dancer stimulus persons) as more responsible for what 
happened than victims of high (college student stimulus per­
sons) or moderate (stock clerk stimulus persons) personal 
similarity. Consequently, strip-tease dancer victims were 
perceived as more deserving of the outcome, as more to blame 
for the incident, and at greater fault for what happened. 
Offenders of strip-tease dancer victims were viewed as 
less blameworthy than were offenders of college student or 
stock clerk victims. For the victimizations of male stimulus 
persons, the effect of personal similarity produced a pattern 
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of attributions similar to subjects1 evaluations of the 
female victimizations. Professional gambler victims (who 
represented low personal similarity victims) were perceived 
as more deserving of the outcome and more to blame for what 
happened than either the college student (high personal 
similarity) or car mechanic (moderate personal similarity) 
victims. Professional gambler victims were also rated as 
less respectable than the other two victim roles. 
A Balance Theory Approach to Explaining 
Victim Perception 
As indicated above, the pattern of subjects' evaluations 
of personal victimizations does not appear to conform to 
either a "self-protective" (defensive attribution) or a 
"self-controlled" (just world) perspective of attribution of 
responsibility. Evidently, to account for the pattern of 
attributions identified in the present study, a different 
explanatory framework is needed. Recently, several investi­
gators (Feldman-Summers & Lindner, 1976: Miller et al., 1976; 
Seligman, Paschall, & Takata, 1974) suggested that victim 
perception patterns could be explained within a balance 
theory framework (Heider, 1946, 1958). These investigators 
suggest that positive and negative patterns of responsibility, 
character, and outcome-attributions could be predicted as a 
function of the extent to which individuals identify with the 
victim and/or perpetrator of the victimization incident. 
Individuals who identify with the victim/perpetrator form 
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"positive" bonds and are expected to perceive ("hold positive 
sentiments toward") the victim/perpetrator in a positive way. 
This "bonding" is expected to result in positive attributions 
regarding personal responsibility, quality of character, and 
so on. For individuals who don't identify strongly with 
either the victim or the perpetrator, or who identify strongly 
with both, their pattern of victimization evaluations is 
expected to reflect the extent to which they identify with 
each of the parties involved. 
Unfortunately, this version of a balance model of vic­
tim perception is practically indistinguishable from the 
O 
defensive attribution model. Both assume individuals' 
perceptions are influenced by the degree to which they iden­
tify with the victim although the motivation for making 
causal and other attributions is presumably different. For 
the defensive attribution model, the motivation is presumably 
self-serving, instigated to protect or provide the illusion 
that one is generally safe from undesirable outcomes. Within 
a balance framework, the motivation stems from the desire to 
protect one's cognitive world from stressful inconsistent 
cognitions. Both views predict that individuals will make 
attributions indicating less personal responsibility for 
victims with whom they strongly identify than for victims 
with whom they do not identify or identify with only slightly. 
Both explanations predict the weaker the identification bond, 
the less favorably a victim is likely to be perceived. Thus, 
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from the standpoint of parsimony, the balance explanation 
which has been suggested in the literature does not appear 
to offer a "better" explanation of victim perception than 
defensive attribution. Furthermore, even without the con­
sideration of parsimony, given the complexities of attribu­
tions reported in the literature representing individuals1 
perceptions of victims, basing an explanatory framework of 
victim perception on the strength of victim/perpetrator 
identification seems woefully inadequate. It is easy to 
generate examples in which an individual is likely to 
identify strongly with the victim (i.e., a teammate) but 
still attribute considerable personal responsibility to the 
victim for an undesirable outcome (e.g., the victim committed 
an error which loses an important game). 
If a cognitive balance process is the motivating prin­
ciple behind how people view the personal misfortunes of 
others, a more complex formulation of the "balancing" process 
than the research to date has presented is needed. At the 
very least a reformulation needs to be distinguishable from 
defensive attribution and involve more than just the extent 
to which an individual "identifies" with a personal misfor­
tune and the persons involved. Toward this goal a victim 
perception model based on a balance process framework is 
offered. At the outset, it should be clear that the frame­
work to be presented represents only a rudimentary framework 
and consequently only general details regarding the conceptual 
processes and the bases for these processes can be presented. 
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People typically form unit associations on the basis of 
past learning, socialization, and cultural influences. These 
associations and the general process of associating one thing 
with another result in the generation of expectancies regard­
ing the typical associations of people, situations, events, 
and outcomes which people are likely to experience. As 
people acquire information concerning associations between 
and among persons, situations, events, and outcomes, they 
frequently infer that if two or more things occur together 
(covary) over time, those things must be somehow causally 
related (Kelley, 1972a). 
When an individual is asked to explain the occurrence 
of an event and the involvement of another in or with the 
events of interest, the individual is likely to explain the 
relation (the involvement of the other) as due either to the 
person, the perpetrator, or both. However, individuals 
usually have only limited information regarding the explicit 
role each party has had in producing the event in question. 
Consequently, the evaluation of victimization incidents 
often is made in the absence of critical details. Kanouse 
(1972) suggests that in the absence of critical details 
individuals make "intuitive probability judgments" about the 
generality or uniqueness of each party's involvement in the 
event. These "judgments" in effect "fill in the gaps" about 
what has occurred and provide a basis by which individuals 
make reasonable guesses regarding personal responsibility 
(causal attribution). 
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Such a reasoning process simply involves applying 
a set of normative assumptions . . . then making 
the "normative" attribution that follows from these 
assumptions. (p. 122) 
Extending Kanouse's notion to include expectancies and 
inferences of causality, the balance model proposed herein 
assumes that people have a set of "normative expectations" 
of what does and does not happen and what should and should 
not happen, and that people base their evaluations of the 
victimizations of others on these expectations. 
The "Normative Expectations" Model 
The guiding cognitive "strategy" postulated by the 
"normative expectations" model is that an individual eval­
uates factors pertaining to the personal misfortune of 
another by comparing the outcome of the incident with what 
might have been expected, given the victim and the circum­
stances under which the incident occurred. 
A major premise of this model is that because indi­
viduals are limited in their perception of the complexities 
of causal relations and causal factors, an inference of 
stability or reliability of a chain of events is often made. 
Individuals1 social perception of the world around them is 
based largely on their past experiences. From these exper­
iences they come to expect that things (people, objects, 
events) will behave like they have in the past or at least 
in a way consistent with previous courses of action. As a 
result of this observation-expectation process individuals 
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develop the tendency to perceive certain people, situations, 
and events as single entities, occurring together predict­
ably over time. These entities and their associated "units" 
(the particular people, situations, and events involved) 
form the basis of expectations regarding when (under what 
circumstances) particular persons, situations, and events 
"should" occur together. These associative relationships 
between and among cognitions of or about people, situations, 
and events provide the basis for the principle of cognitive 
balance. If an individual's cognitions about an entity 
relationship are in harmony, the relationship among the 
particular set of cognitions is considered "balanced." 
Conversely, if there is a perceived discordance in the 
associative relationship among a particular set of cogni­
tions, the relationship is considered "unbalanced." 
Balanced associations are generally consistent with 
an individual's expectations and generally produce favorable 
affect. Unbalanced relationships are generally counter to 
an individual's expectations and their occurrence is presumed 
to be psychologically discomforting. The effect of this 
"discomfort" is to activate a cognitive response which can 
accommodate (balance) the perceived discordant association. 
The perception of an "unbalanced" association is not itself 
sufficient to activate the cognitive balancing process. The 
discordance must represent a sufficient threat to an indi­
vidual's personal view of reality. To qualify as a "sufficient 
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threat" the discordant relationship must be important (cap­
able of affecting meaningful consequences) and have personal 
relevance (represent something meaningful) for an individual. 
The degree to which an individual is motivated to restore a 
state of balance among discrepant cognitions is dependent on 
the magnitude of the discrepancy among the cognitions in 
question and how important and personally relevant the per­
ceived discrepancy is to the individual. The more important 
and relevant the perceived discrepancy the greater the prob­
ability that an individual will feel the need to restore a 
state of balance among the discrepant cognitive units. Dis­
crepant relationships which lack sufficient importance or 
personal relevance are not likely to activate the balance 
process. 
Application of the "Normative Expectations" Model 
Considering the dimensions of a personal victimization 
manipulated in the present study, the "normative expecta­
tions" model would have predicted patterns of attributions 
consistent with the following propositions: (1) Because 
similar others are expected to be more liked, admired, or 
respected than dissimilar others, the more personally simi­
lar a victim is perceived to be, the more compensatory (less 
victim blame-oriented, more offender blame-oriented) observers 
are expected to be in their attributions regarding the victim 
and the victim's role in a personal victimization incident. 
87 
(2) The relevance of a situation is important only to the 
extent it provides a basis for observers' expectations con­
cerning the situation and the victimization in question. 
In general, the more relevant a situation the more likely 
observers will hold definite expectations regarding that 
situation. (3) Because the occurrence of severe outcomes is 
generally less comprehensible than less severe outcomes, 
incidents.for which a victim experiences a severe outcome are 
likely to produce greater discrepant perceptions than inci­
dents resulting in a low severe outcome. Recommendations of 
compensation (attributions which exculpate the victim and 
blame the offender) for victims are expected to increase as 
a function of increases in the severity of the outcome. 
Turning to the data reported in the present study, the 
explanatory framework provided by the "normative expecta­
tions" model appears to be able to account for the pattern 
of attributions representing subjects1 perceptions of the 
victimization incidents. Table 9 presents a summary of the 
findings and indicates which results can be accounted for 
by the "normative expectations" model. Beginning with the 
responsibility ratings and victim social role, the data 
indicate that subjects assigned greater responsibility 
to the least personally similar/socially respectable female 
role when compared with stimulus person roles rated as more 
personally similar/socially respectable. In line with 
the model, personal similarity per se did not produce greater 
Table 9 
Summary of Significant Results Compared with Predictions of 
the "Normative Expectations" Model 
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attributions of responsibility. The stock clerk role 
was rated as more personally dissimilar but attributions 
did not differ between this role and the college student 
stimulus role. Instead, apparently inferences about the 
social role/personal character of a strip-tease dancer 
accounted (i.e., an association with sexual permissiveness) 
for differences in perceptions of personal responsibility 
assigned strip-tease dancers and the other two stimulus 
person roles (which usually do not carry such sexually 
explicit connotations). Similarly, subjects' perceived dif­
ferences in personal responsibility among male stimulus 
person roles were also more a function of social respectabil­
ity than personal similarity. Stimulus persons portrayed as 
professional gamblers were perceived as more responsible for 
their victimizations than stimulus persons similarly vic­
timized identified as college students and car mechanics 
(the latter two roles were not perceived as significantly 
different along a dimension of personal similarity). Appar­
ently, subjects associated the role of a gambler with greater 
likelihood of precipitating a personal assault (perhaps due 
to an association of gambling with illicit or illegal activ­
ity) than the other stimulus roles. 
Other support for a "normative expectations" model 
interpretation is offered by the ratings of the degree of 
"victim fault" and "victim respectability" involving female 
victims as a function of the situation. According to the 
"normative expectations" view, some situations are likely to 
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carry a higher probability of risk of personal victimization 
than others. Among the social settings used in the study, 
the night club/bar setting has a subjectively higher associa­
tion of risk than either waiting alone at a bus stop or 
walking alone to work or class. The results indicate sup­
port for this interpretation. Female victims vere assigned 
more fault for their victimizations and were perceived as 
less socially respectable when they were portrayed as sex­
ually assaulted while on their way to a night club than when 
their victimizations were reported as occurring either while 
walking alone to work or class or while waiting alone at a 
bus stop. Another indication that the night club setting 
was perceived as more risky than the other two settings was 
provided by the fact that while victims assaulted in a night 
club setting were perceived as significantly less respect­
able and more at fault, they were not perceived as signifi­
cantly more deserving or more to blame for their victimiza­
tions. Hence, stimulus persons assaulted in night club 
settings were apparently perceived as taking a greater risk 
by being in the setting, but were not perceived as any more 
responsible for being sexually assaulted than victims attacked 
in the other two settings. 
Other results consistent with a "normative expectations" 
explanation involved the pattern of attributions regarding 
the victimizations as a function of the severity of the out­
come. The more severe outcomes, rape and serious physical 
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injury, were evaluated as more serious than the less severe 
outcomes, attempted rape and mild physical injury. Rape 
victim offenders were also recommended harsher levels of 
punishment than offenders of attempted rape victims. Subjects 
also tended to hold more favorable impressions of victimiza­
tions which resulted in the more severe outcomes. This pat­
tern was particularly true for assessments of the sexual 
assault victimizations portrayed in the night club setting; 
rape victimizations produced less culpable evaluations of 
the victim compared with attempted rape victimizations. This 
pattern of attributions suggests that observers may use dif­
ferent standards for evaluating personal victimizations on 
the basis of what happens during the incident. Some evidence 
for this interpretation has been reported by Krulewitz and 
Payne (1978). These investigators found in an assessment of 
attributions about rape, that subjects required proof that 
an attacker used direct and obvious force during a sexual 
assault before they perceived the attack as a clear case of 
forcible rape. The basis for this pattern may be related 
to how society tends to view the phenomenon of personal vic­
timizations. Individuals who encounter only "mild" suffer­
ing as a victim are likely to receive less sympathy and com­
pensation than victims whose suffering is much greater. 
Observers of incidents in which the victim experiences some 
serious negative outcome may be more inclined to be less 
certain of a victim's culpability for the incident than if 
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the outcome of the incident is less severe. Consequently, 
ambiguity about a victim's role in a personal victimization 
may result in lesser attributions of responsibility as a 
function of increased severity of outcome—as the severity 
increases observers perceive the victim as less likely to 
have been responsible for what happened. And, if this 
interpretation is correct, in terms of a "normative expec­
tations" explanation, individuals may be more motivated to 
balance discrepant perceptions of incidents involving high 
severe outcomes than ones resulting in relatively less severe 
consequences. 
Considerations Affecting the Utility of the Models 
Despite its apparent superiority for predicting the 
pattern of attributions found in the present study, it would 
be unwise to conclude that the "normative expectations" 
model is in all respects a "better" model of victim percep­
tion. At its present stage of development, the "normative 
expectations" model is, at best, only a rudimentary model of 
victim perception. Besides the assumptions that people 
strive for consistency among their cognitions and that an 
imbalance between important cognitions is likely to motivate 
an individual to seek ways to resolve the discrepancy between 
those cognitions, the model is imprecise regarding the condi­
tions which are necessary before the particular cognitive 
organization pattern identified by the model is "activated." 
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Without greater specificity of these conditions, the applica­
tion of the model is limited and produces the result that 
empirical tests are guided more by intuition than conceptual 
relevance. Another problem with the "normative expectations" 
model is that it is ambiguous concerning the order in which 
a "balance" of discrepant cognitions is reached. This 
ambiguity is also a major deficit of the defensive attribu­
tion and just world models. In terms of predicting attribu­
tions of responsibility for a given instance of a personal 
misfortune, the just world and defensive attribution models 
tend to be unclear regarding which class (behavioral, charac-
terological, or nonpersonal) of responsibility attribution 
will be invoked, which class of attribution is most impor­
tant, and whether or not these classes of attributions share 
a common scale of magnitude and can be directly compared. 
In this regard, the "normative expectations" model is only 
somewhat better; because it doesn't presume individuals will 
blame another for a personal misfortune, nonpersonal respon­
sibility attributions are expected to be the most likely type 
of attribution made. The model does not specify anything 
about the other two classes of responsibility attributions 
and also shares with the other models a lack of specificity 
regarding magnitude and relative importance. 
Although the findings of this study indicate essentially 
little (in the case of defensive attribution) and no (in 
the case of just world) support for the defensive attribution 
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tion and just world models, it would be premature (and inap­
propriate) to conclude that based on the present data either 
model is unable to predict individuals1 perceptions of the 
victimizations of others. There are several reasons for this 
conclusion. One reason is that the context in which observ­
ers are asked to make an evaluation of a personal misfortune 
is a major factor in the evaluation process (Luginbuhl & 
Frederick, Note 1; Myers, 1980: Vidmar & Crinklaw, 1974) 
and may be critical to the "activation" of the cognitive 
organization patterns predicted by the models. Luginbuhl 
and Frederick (Note 1) suggest that a major reason for the 
inconsistencies in results in the "perceptions of the per­
sonal misfortunes of others" research has been due to dif­
ferences in the "frame-of-reference" context subjects have 
been instructed to use in making their evaluations. Gen­
erally, there has been the tendency to mix a jury process 
context with an impression-formation evaluation context. In 
the jury process context, observers are asked to consider 
the details of a victimization incident and the attributes 
of the involved parties as a means of deciding the guilt or 
innocence of the alleged offender. In comparison, in the 
context of an impression-formation exercise, instructions 
to observers are less specific and the focus of the assess­
ment is less on whether the alleged offender is guilty or 
not, but more on the overall perception of what happened and 
why. In the present study an impression formation context 
was used because of its more general application to everyday 
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events and because it matched more closely with the "naive 
observer" role concept assumed by most attribution models 
(Jones & Davis, 1965). Conceivably, this kind of evaluation 
context may not be well suited to activate the cognitive 
organization processes identified by the defensive attribu­
tion and just world models. Perhaps, asking just for impres­
sions of personal misfortunes involving others is insuffi­
cient in creating the perception that an incident poses a 
real enough threat to observers1 sense of personal security 
(defensive attribution) or that an incident represents an 
undeserved outcome (just world) to invoke the cognitive orga­
nization processes identified by the models. The explanatory 
power of the defensive attribution and just world models may 
be limited to specific evaluation contexts or apply most 
optimally to conditions relevant to a particular evaluation 
context (i.e., when observers are asked to evaluate the per­
sonal misfortunes of another and to explain why a similar 
fate could or could not possibly happen to them). 
Another reason why the results of this study may not 
disprove the models is that only the perceptions of female 
observers were assessed. It is possible that male observers 
might have perceived the victimization incidents differently 
from females and made attributions consistent with one of 
the models. Some data (e.g., Kerr & Kurtz, 1977) suggest 
that males may be more inclined to hold a just world view 
of people's personal misfortunes. There is also some evi­
dence (e.g., Fulero & Delara, 1976) which suggests that the 
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pattern of defensive attributions might also differ as a 
function of the sex of the observer. 
A third consideration concerning the utility of the 
models involves the stimulus situations used in the study. 
Although previous research (e.g., Fulero & Delara, 1976: 
Kahn et al. , 1977: Kerr & Kurtz, 1977) has used stimulus 
situations involving personal victimizations like rape and 
physical assault, the general pattern of results of these 
studies has tended to indicate either limited or ambiguous 
support for the models. It is possible that while personal 
victimizations have the advantage of being conceptually 
"cleaner" (i.e., the roles of victim and perpetrator are not 
confounded) than instances of personal misfortunes, it may 
be this conceptual clarity that reduces the models' ability 
to predict observers' perceptions. Heider (1958) noted that 
in situations characterized by unmistakable causal informa­
tion, attributional distortion is likely to be minimal. The 
conceptual ambiguity inherent in personal misfortunes involv­
ing accidents or mistakes may prevent individuals from 
clearly distinguishing individual levels of responsibility 
from more general levels of responsibility (Shaw & Sulzer, 
1964: Vidmar & Crinklaw, 1974). As a consequence, in the 
absence of clear evidence that a victim of a personal victim­
ization was (not) personally responsible for the incident, 
individuals may be likely to resort to the self-protective 
type of attributions guided by the factors predicted by the 
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defensive attribution ("I would have avoided it") and just 
world ("it never would have happened to me") models. 
Victim Perception and Kelley's Notion of 
Causal Schemata 
A framework which offers both a general perspective 
and a way in which the various proposed models of victim 
perception might be integrated into a more comprehensive 
model is suggested by Kelley's (1972b) "causal schemata" 
framework. A causal schema is a general conception an indi­
vidual has about how certain kinds of causes (factors) inter­
act to produce a specific kind of effect (event). 
Causal schemata reflect the individual's basic notions 
of reality and his assumption about the existence of a 
stable external world—a world comprised of permanent, 
though moving and apparently variant, objects7 a world 
separate from and independent of himself; and a world 
seen by other persons in the same way as by himself. 
(Kelley, 1972b, p. 153) 
In view of the lack of consistent support in the literature 
for any one model, it is conceivable that each model may -
actually represent distinct causal schemata by which indi­
viduals organize their perceptions of the personal misfor­
tunes of others. (See Table 10 for a brief summary of the 
cognitive organization patterns posited by each of the 
models.) 
This notion of multiple cognitive organization patterns 
and in particular Kelley's causal schemata framework suggests 
a possible resolution to the discrepancies in the data 
reported in the literature regarding victim perception. By 
Table 10 
Cognitive Organization Patterns Identified by the Models 
Models Cognitive Organization Process Outcome of the Process 
Just World Observer perceives the 
personal misfortune of 
another 
Adjusts perception of 
the incident so that 
it is consistent with 
the belief that the 
world is just and the 
victim's outcome was 
deserved 
Likely to attribute 
responsibility for the 
misfortune due to the 
victim's behavior or 
character in order to 
explain an "undeserved" 
outcome. 
Defensive Attribution Observer perceives the 
personal misfortune of 
another 
Alters the perception 
of the victim's role 
in the incident in 
terms of self-protec­
tive defensive attri­
butions which provide 
self-assurance against 
blame or harm 
Likely to attribute 
blame to a dissimilar 
other and excuse and be 
sympathetic toward a 
similar other who is a 




Observer perceives the 
personal misfortune of 
another 
Makes an assessment 
based on what is 
observed and evaluates 
the victim's role and 
the incident in terms 
of general social 
norms. 
Likely to attribute per­
sonal responsibility on 
the basis of what is 
inferred or assumed 
about the victim's 
behavior and social 
character; the more neg­
ative the perception of 
the victim the greater 
the attribution of 
personal responsibility. 
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positing that individuals might resort to one of a number of 
causal schemata to explain a victimization incident, this 
approach provides a basis for why individuals observing the 
same incident might make different interpretations regarding 
factors related to causality, responsibility, and outcome. 
Because two individuals are not likely to perceive the same 
constellation of factors the same way, their evaluations are 
likely to differ along dimensions which are pertinent to the 
"activation" of a particular causal schema. This could 
explain why in some cases individuals appear to evaluate a 
victimization incident in terms of its apparent threat to 
their self-security, while in other cases individuals make 
evaluations which appear to match the belief that the 
"victim got what she/he deserved," and still in other cases 
why the evaluation appears to be consistent with what might 
be considered a "normative expectations" view of personal 
misfortunes. Hence, within a causal schema framework the 
"co-existence" of opposing causal explanations is possible. 
A major implication of the causal schema framework per­
spective is that prediction of victim perception patterns 
may be more complex than previous efforts have assumed. 
Simple manipulations of victim/offender characteristics, 
situational factors, and outcome factors may only partly 
account for observer differences in perceiving the personal 
victimization of others. As suggested by the defensive attri­
bution and just world models, it is not only the complexity 
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of factors but the implication these factors have for an 
observer which is likely to influence how they perceive 
another's personal misfortune. For example, in the present 
study, subjects may not have perceived the victimization 
incidents as sufficiently threatening to their personal 
security (defensive attribution) or as instances of dis­
crepant outcomes, deservedness, and justice requiring counter­
intuitive causal attributions. Consequently, in the absence 
of the appropriate conditions for invoking a defensive attri­
bution or just world explanation, a "normative expectations" 
explanation may simply have been more suitable. Conceivably, 
a different pattern of causal attributions would have resulted 
if the personal relevance was increased to the point that 
subjects were likely to experience at least the same general 
situation the victims encountered or if the information 
regarding the incidents was more complete so that subjects 
could have more adequately determined whether the victimiza­
tion incidents represented undeserved outcomes in need of 
justification. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
It will be the task of future research to determine if 
there is a set of "ideal" conditions for which each model 
schema is optimally efficient in predicting victim perceptions. 
Such an assessment will require a more rigorous operationali-
zation of conceptually and empirically relevant conditions. 
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For example, the research to date suggests that different 
degrees of personal involvement in the evaluation process 
have a definite influence on observers1 evaluations of the 
personal victimizations of others (e.g., Alexander, 1980: 
Lincoln & Levinger, 1972; Wilson & Donnerstein, 1977). Con­
sequently, future research involving the modeIs/schemata 
reviewed in this paper needs to consider how observers1 per­
ceptions might vary across different social and situational 
contexts, including the general context in which the per­
ception is made (i.e., a jury simulation vs. an impression 
formation exercise), the observer's role in the event being 
evaluated (i.e., whether the observer is only an observer or 
is also the victim, the perpetrator or both), and the conse­
quences the observer's evaluation has either for her/himself 
or for the object of the observation. 
Research involving perception of personal victimizations 
should also consider the possibility that the cognitive orga­
nization identified by each of the modeIs/schemata actually, 
represents different cognitive strategies related to individ­
ual or group differences. As noted earlier, there is some 
evidence that males and females perceive incidents of personal 
misfortunes differently. Other factors such as age, socio­
economic status, race, and specific personality traits or 
characteristics may also be associated with different cogni­
tive strategies affecting how perceptions of events are 
organized and processed. 
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In conclusion, there is still much to be learned about 
why and how people blame victims for their personal misfor­
tunes. Hopefully, as our understanding of this phenomenon 
increases it will provide a direction for developing ways to 
counter the tendency of people to perceive others as per­
sonally responsible for a misfortune solely on the basis of 
who they are while ignoring facts and evidence which indi­
cate a contrary conclusion. 
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Footnotes 
"'"This selection procedure was based on data reported 
by Fulero and Delara (1976), who demonstrated that personal 
similarity and social respectability are positively corre­
lated: when observers view someone as respectable, they 
identify with that individual and see her/him as personally 
similar to themselves. 
2 The possibility that subjects' evaluations of the male 
victimization incident were influenced by their exposure to 
the description of a female victimization incident was exam­
ined by testing for differences among evaluations of the 
male victimization incidents as a function of the female 
stimulus role they were presented. This assessment was 
made via a3x3x3x2 between-groups design. Three of 
the factors represented the primary effects, personal simi­
larity (victim role), situational relevance (social setting), 
and severity of outcome (personal outcome) of the male 
stimulus situations. The fourth factor represented the female 
stimulus role portrayed in the female victimization incident 
a subject was as-ked to evaluate. A MANOVA was performed 
involving the 10 dependent variables representing subjects1 
ratings of the male victimization situations. No significant 
multivariate effects (JD ^ .05) were found. These results 
indicate that subjects' ratings of the male stimulus situa­
tions were essentially uncorrelated with their ratings of 
the female victimizations. It was therefore assumed that 
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the case accounts portraying victimizations of males and 
females could be treated as separate and independent stim­
ulus situations. 
3 Subjects were asked to rate the personal similarity 
of a set of social roles which included the six roles that 
were used for the personal similarity manipulation. The 
results of these ratings broken down by stimulus (victim) 
role group and for the total sample are presented in Table 2 
(see Appendix G). Comparison of the means of the female 
stimulus roles (via t-tests) indicated that the college stu­
dent role was perceived as significantly more personally 
similar (JD<.01) than the stock clerk or strip-tease dancer 
role. The stock clerk role was perceived as significantly 
more personally similar (JD<.01) than the strip-tease dancer 
role. These results indicate that the personal similarity 
manipulation involving the three female stimulus person roles 
was successful. The college student was perceived as most 
similar, the strip-tease dancer as the least similar, while 
the stock clerk was intermediate in terms of perceived simi­
larity. 
Comparison of the means by male victim stimulus role 
group also revealed significant differences (via t-tests) 
of perceived similarity between social roles. The college 
student role was rated as significantly more personally sim­
ilar <E< .01) than either the car mechanic or professional 
gambler role. The car mechanic role was also perceived as 
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significantly more personally similar (£<.05) than the 
professional gambler role. These latter results indicate 
that the manipulation of personal similarity of the male 
stimulus victims was successful; the college student was per­
ceived as most similar, the professional gambler as least 
similar, and the car mechanic as intermediate in terms of 
personal similarity. (Note: Apparently, perceived social 
respectability and the degree to which subjects identified 
with each of the male stimulus roles was highly correlated.) 
^Due to an insufficient number of males (N<40), data 
for males are not reported. 
5 The relative importance of each dependent measure for 
the multivariate effects found significant essentially par­
allelled the dependent variables for which significant uni­
variate differences were found. Because of this close 
similarity the canonical correlations are not presented. 
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Besides the main analysis reported in the results, a 
series of secondary analyses were conducted to compare pre­
dictions made by the just world and defensive attribution 
models. These secondary analyses were performed on ratings 
of the dependent measures of subgroups of the total subject 
sample. Separate ANOVAs were computed for the 10 dependent 
variables for all subjects who (1) indicated some possibility 
that what happened to the victim could also happen to them, 
(2) felt to some extent the victim deserved the outcome, 
(3) attributed at least some blame to the victim for what 
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happened, and (4) felt the incident was to some extent the 
victim's fault. These analyses were computed separately for 
subjects' ratings of the female and male victimization inci­
dents. The results of these analyses revealed few signifi­
cant results which differed from the main analyses. One 
revealing finding that the secondary analyses did produce 
was the substantial number of subjects who felt the situa­
tions had some relevance for them and the number of subjects 
who attributed some responsibility to the stimulus persons 
for their victimizations. The possibility of experiencing 
a fate similar to that of the victim was admitted by 239 (89%) 
of the subjects when the victimization involved a female and 
230 (85%) of the subjects when the victimization involved a 
male. The perception that the victim deserved the outcome 
was indicated by 109 (40%) of the subjects when the victim 
was a female and 95 (36%) of the subjects when the victim was 
a male. The assessment of how much victims were to blame for 
what happened revealed that 142 (53%) of the subjects did 
not feel the victim was entirely blameless, while 112 (41%) 
of the subjects felt that male victims were partially to blame 
for their victimizations. Attributions of the incident being 
due to some degree the victim's fault (not due to chance) 
were made by 185 (69%) of the subjects when the victimiza­
tion incident involved a female and 157 (58%) of the subjects 
when the victimization incident involved a male. 
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7 
Also included are univariate effects for which signif­
icant multivariate effects were not found. These results 
are admittedly statistically "weak", but are included for 
purposes of providing the broadest picture of significant 
differences among the dependent measures. 
8 Inasmuch as the just world model bases its explanatory 
process on the perception of deservedness and not an identi­
fication with the victim, considerations of a just world 
framework and this version of a balance model are different 
enough to be treated as distinct models of victim perception. 
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Note: The ratings were made on 5-point scales. N's are presented in parentheses ( ), 
, Lower ratings correspond with higher similarity. 
Lower ratings correspond with greater likelihood. 
.Lower ratings correspond with greater likelihood. 
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strip-tease to a rape 4.06 (17) 2.71 (17) 3.14 (7) 1.82 (17) 
dancer nightclub 
rape 3.67 (18) 2.33 (18) 2.60 (5) 1.50 (18) 
Note: The ratings were made on 5-point scales. N's are presented in parentheses ( ). 
?Lower ratings correspond with higher similarity. 
Lower ratings correspond with greater likelihood. 
L̂ower ratings correspond with greater likelihood. 
Lower ratings correspond with greater seriousness. 
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Note: The ratings were made on 5-point scales. N's are presented in parentheses ( ). 
L̂ower ratings correspond with higher similarity. 
Lower ratings correspond with greater likelihood. 
L̂ower ratings correspond with greater likelihood. 
dLower ratings correspond with greater seriousness. 
Social Role Social Personal Perceived Likelihood Likelihood Seriousness 
Settinq Outcome Similarity of Experi­ of ever being of the 
encing Same in the Same Outcome 
Outcome Situation 
mild 
car waiting assault - 3.08 (12) 3.29 (7) 2.50 (12) 
mechanic for a 
bus severe 
assault — 3.00 (10) 3.20 (5) 2.10 (10) 
mild 
car going assault - 3.00 (16) 3.71 (7) 2.38 (16) 
mechanic to a 
bar severe 
assault - 2.95 (19) 3.60 (5) 1.89 (19) 
ex-con waiting mild 
(alternate for a assault - 2.82 (17) 3.71 (7) 2.65 (17) 
to profes­ bus 
sional gamb­ severe 
ler role) assault — 2.42 (19) 3.20 (5) 1.89 (19) 
mild 
professional going assault - 3.06 (17) 3.14 (7) 2.47 (17) 
gambler to a 
bar severe 
assault — 2.95 (19) 3.60 (5) 2.16 (17) 
Note: The ratings were made on 5-point scales. N's are presented in parentheses ( ). 
L̂ower ratings correspond with higher similarity. 
Lower ratings correspond with greater likelihood. 
.Lower ratings correspond with greater likelihood. 
Lower ratings correspond with greater seriousness. 
APPENDIX B 
Examples of Stimulus Situations 
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Victimization of a Female 
Early one evening, as Kathy, a 19-year-old college student, 
walks to class along a residential street several blocks 
from campus, a man comes up and propositions her to have 
sex with him. Kathy ignores the man and starts to cross the 
street when he pulls a knife and demands that she keep quiet 
and do what he says. Kathy tries to pull away from the man 
but he forces her behind some trees and demands she take her 
clothes off. She refuses and struggles with her assailant 
as he takes her clothes off, but she is unable to fight off 
his advances and he succeeds in forcing her to engage in sex­
ual intercourse. Just then, the voices of several people 
coming down the street startle Kathy's assailant and he 
avoids detection by running off behind some houses. 
Kathy runs out into the street and a passing female motorist 
pulls over to see if she needs help. Upon learning that 
Kathy had just been assaulted, the driver of the car takes 
her to a hospital. 
A medical examination confirms that Kathy had been forced 
to engage in sexual intercourse. 
While at the hospital Kathy reports her assault and after a 
search of the neighborhood, Kathy's assailant is apprehended 
and arrested by the police. 
121 
One evening, while on her way to meet some friends at a night 
club across town from where she works, Sally, a 34-year-old 
strip-tease dancer is stopped by a man who asks her the time. 
Sally ignores the man and keeps on walking, but he grabs her 
and prevents her from screaming by threatening her with a 
knife. He then forces her into the hallway of a deserted 
building and propositions her to have sex with him. Sally 
refuses and tries to pull away from him. She struggles with 
him as he attempts to take her clothes off. Just then, the 
voices of several people outside the building startle Sally's 
assailant and he avoids detection by going out a rear fire 
escape. 
Sally staggers out into the street and a passing female motorist 
pulls over to see if she needs help. Upon learning that Sally 
had just been assaulted, the driver of the car takes her to a 
hospital. 
A medical examination reveals that as a result of the assault, 
Sally received a slight bruise on her chest, but no evidence 
of attempted intercourse is indicated. 
While at the hospital Sally reports her assault and after a 
search of the neighborhood where the assault took place, 
Sally's assailant is apprehended and arrested by the police. 
Victimization of a Male 
While on his way to meet some friends at a bar one evening, 
Bob, a 47-year-old professional gambler, is stopped just out­
side the bar by a man who demands that he hand over his wal­
let. Bob refuses and starts to walk away when the man pulls 
a knife and forces him into an alley several doors down from 
the bar. Once in the alley, the man knocks Bob down and 
grabs for his wallet. The two struggle for a while but 
Bob's assailant is able to push himself free and run off 
with Bob's wallet. 
A passing motorist sees Bob stagger into the street holding 
his side and stops to see if he needs any help. Upon learn­
ing that Bob had just been attacked, the driver of the car 
takes him to a hospital. 
A medical examination reveals that as a result of the attack, 
Bob's jaw was fractured and several ribs were broken. 
While at the hospital, Bob reports the incident to the police 
and after a search of the neighborhood where the attack 
occurred, Bob's assailand is apprehended and arrested by the 
police. 
123 
Early one morning, While Frank, a 43-year-old car mechanic, 
waits alone for a bus to take him to work, a man comes up to 
him and demands that he hand over his wallet. Frank refuses 
and begins to walk across the street when the man grabs him 
and flashes a knife in his face. The man orders Frank to 
walk toward a car parked on the side of the road. When they 
reach the car, the man grabs for Frank's wallet and there is 
a brief struggle which ends with Frank being shoved against 
the car and knocked down. The assailant then picks up 
Frank's wallet and disappears down the street. 
A passing motorist sees Frank sitting on the side of the road 
holding his side and stops to see if he needs any help. 
Upon learning Frank had just been attacked, the driver of 
the car takes him to a hospital. 
A medical examination reveals that as a result of the 
attack, Frank received only a minor bruise on his chest. 
While at the hospital Frank reports the incident to the 
police and after a search of the neighborhood, Frank's 











2. To what extent can you identify deal 









How likely do you think you would very 
ever be in the same situation as likely 
the victim and experience a sim- 1 





4. To what extent do you feel the 








5. What, if anything, did the victim 
do to encourage the incident? 
To what extent do you feel the 










To what extent do you feel the 
offender was to blame for the 
incident? 
8. To what extent do you feel the 
victim's involvement in the inci­


















9. Considering what happened and 
what could have happened to the 
victim, how serious was the vic­
tim's misfortune? 
10. How respectable do you feel 















11. If the person responsible for the harsh 
incident is guilty of a crime, 12 3 4 5 
what kind of prison sentence 






Year in school 
INSTRUCTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to assess how people view the 
personal misfortunes of others. To help us determine how 
people do perceive the personal misfortunes of others, we 
would like you to read brief descriptions of two incidents 
in which an individual experiences a personal misfortune 
and then answer some questions regarding how you perceived 
each incident. We also wish to collect some additional 
information and have included several other brief question­
naires we would like you to complete. 
Please complete the questionnaires in the order they appear 
in the booklet. Please read and answer all questions care­
fully. 
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Severity of seriousness of the 
the Incident incident 
offender punishment 
aJudge 1 did not categorize "offender blame" 
Judge 2 Judge 3 
victim similarity 
identification with 
the victim's misfortune 
victim respectability 
likelihood of experiencing 
same fate 










the victim's misfortune 
likelihood of experiencing 
same fate 






seriousness of the 
incident 
offender punishment 
into one of the three groupings. 
APPENDIX F 
Factor Analysis of the Dependent Measures 
Victimization of a Female Victimization of a Male 
Variable Group Variables Factor la Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
victim similarity b • • • .80 •. • • • • • 00
 
• • • 
Identification identification with victim's 
with the misfortune • • • .59 • • • .67 • • • 
Victim 
likelihood of experiencing 
same fate • • • .65 • • • ... .61 • • « 
victim deserved the outcome -.72 * . • •. • —.70 ... • • • 
victim blame -.89 -.96 ... • • • 
Victim 
Responsibility victim fault .60 
• * • • • • 
.46 ... • • • 
victim respectability .50 • * . • • # .44 ... ... 
offender blame .46 • • • .43 ... 
Severity seriousness of the incident .56 • • • • • • .53 
of the 
Incident offender punishment .66 • • • • • • .52 
A varimax rotation was performed. A near identifcal factor pattern was produced using a 
. quartimax rotation. 
Loadings less than .40 are not shown. 
APPENDIX G 
Ratings of Personal Similarity 
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Table 1 
Ratings of Personal Similarity 
Social Role Victim Role Group Total Sample 
N X SD N X SD 
~ college 90 1.37 .94 270 1.31 .87 
gj student 
H 
g stock 90 460 1.90 270 4.76 1.76 
$ clerk 
strip-tease 90 6.68 .81 270 6.71 .74 
f— college 90 1.34 .88 270 1.31 .87 
student 




professional 90 6.40 1.28 269^ 6.29 1.26 
Due to a clerical error, a substantial number of subjects 
were not asked to rate the personal similarity of themselves 
to the car mechanic role. 
One rating was omitted by one subject. 
APPENDIX H 
Mean Ratings of Stimulus Situations Portraying 
a Victimization of a Female 
Table 2 
Mean Ratings of Identification with the Victim Variables 
Social Settincr 
Walk Bus Stop Night Club 







Victim Role Victim Similarity3 
strip-tease dancer 15 6.20 6.07 6.27 6.07 6.73 6.00 
stock clerk 15 5.07 4.73 6.07 4.87 5.93 5.47 
college student 15 3.73 4.73 4.53 4.27 4.73 4.87 
Identification with the Victim's Misfortune 
b 
strip-tease dancer 15 4.73 4.67 4.53 4.60 5.00 4.13 
stock clerk 15 4.67 4.80 5.33 3.27 5.33 4.07 
college student 15 3.73 3.73 4.73 3.80 4.60 4.67 
Likelihood of Experiencing a Similar Misfortune0 
strip-tease dancer 15 5.13 5.00 4.33 5.27 5.47 4.93 
stock clerk 15 3.93 3.67 4.13 4.13 5.40 4.00 
college student 15 3.60 3.73 4.13 4.73 4.27 4.07 
?The lower the rating the greater the perceived similarity. 
The lower the rating the greater the identification. 
cThe lower the rating the more the experience was perceived as likely. 
Table 3 
Mean Ratings of Victim Responsibility Variables 
Social Settinq 
Walk Bus Stop Night Club 







Victim Role Victim Deserved the Outcome3 
strip-tease dancer 15 5.47 6.00 5.27 5.80 5.47 5.80 
stock clerk 15 6.60 6.53 6.07 6.80 5.73 6.40 
college student 15 6.73 6.27 6.80 6.27 5.87 6.13 
T. 
Victim Blame 
strip-tease dancer 15 5.47 5.67 5.20 5.87 4.67 5.93 
stock clerk 15 6.33 6.33 6.33 6.13 5.13 6.47 
college student 15 6.53 6.47 6.67 6.13 5.60 6.20 
Victim Fault0 
strip-tease dancer 15 2.47 2.73 2.60 2.73 3.40 2.80 
stock clerk 15 1.80 2.20 2.13 2.33 3.07 1.80 
college student 15 2.07 2.47 1.67 2.20 3.13 2.40 
fjThe lower the rating the more the victim deserved the outcome. 
The lower the rating the more the victim was blamed. 
cThe higher the rating the less the incident was perceived as the victim's fault. 
Table 3 (continued) 
Social Setting 
Walk Bus Stop Night Club 
Attempted Attempted Attempted 




strip-tease dancer 15 4.33 4.67 4.07 4.67 4.93 4.73 
stock clerk 15 2.00 2.33 2.13 2.00 3.80 2.27 
college student 15 2.07 1.60 1.80 2.07 2.80 2.67 
Offender Blamee 
strip-tease dancer 15 1.80 1.40 1.67 1.27 1.67 1.27 
stock clerk 15 1.20 1.13 1.47 1.13 1.47 1.07 
college student 15 1.20 1.20 1.13 1.20 1.40 1.13 
j 
The higher the rating the lower the perceived respectability. 
The lower the rating the more the offender was blamed. 
Table 4 
Mean Ratings of Severity of the Incident Variables 
Social Settincf 
Walk Bus Stop Niqht Club 
Attempted Attempted Attempted 
Personal Outcome N Rape Rape Rape Rape Rape Rape 
Victim Role Seriousness of the Incident5 
strip-tease dancer 15 3.40 2.13 3.60 2.40 3.87 2.67 
stock clerk 15 3.73 1.60 4.27 2.27 4.87 2.20 
college student 15 3.40 2.53 3.07 2.40 2.87 2.67 
Offender Punishment 
strip-tease dancer 15 2.60 1.20 1.87 1.87 2.53 1.80 
stock clerk 15 2.20 1.33 2.20 1.47 2.13 1.53 
college student 15 2.33 1.40 1.80 1.47 1.80 1.33 
.?The lower the rating the more serious the incident was perceived. 
The lower the rating the larger the recommended punishment. 
APPENDIX I 
Mean Ratings of Stimulus Situations Portraying 
a Victimization of a Male 
Table 5 
Mean Ratings of Identification with the Victim Variables 
Social Settinq 
Walk Bus Stop Niqht Club 










professional gambler 15 6.00 5.73 5.80 4.80 6.60 5.80 
car mechanic 15 5.40 4.87 4.67 4.87 6.13 5.40 
college student 15 4.46 4.73 5.47 3.80 5.33 6.00 
Identification with the Victim' s Misfortune''3 
professional gambler 15 4.73 4.80 5.13 3.60 5.33 5.20 
car mechanic 15 4.27 4.33 4.47 4.27 5.67 4.07 
college student 15 4.47 4.60 5.13 3.67 4.80 4.80 
Likelihood of Experiencinq c a Similar Misfortune 
professional gambler 15 5.40 4.13 4.80 4.13 5.73 4.93 
car mechanic 15 3.27 3.07 3.87 4.47 5.33 4.20 
college student 15 3.80 3.87 4.73 3.60 4.87 5.13 
^The lower the rating the greater the perceived similarity. 
The lower the rating the greater the identification. 
°The lower the rating the more the experience was perceived as likely. 
Table 6 
Mean Ratings of Victim Responsibility Variables 
Social Settinq 
Walk Bus Stop Niqht Club 







Victim Role Victim Deserved the Outcome3 
professional gambler 15 5.73 5.93 5.47 6.07 5.67 6.40 
car mechanic 15 6.53 6., 80 6.67 6.47 6.53 6.67 
college student 15 6.60 6.80 6.73 6.73 6.33 6.47 
Victim Blame*3 
professional gambler 15 6.20 5.47 5.60 6.20 6.57 6.33 
car mechanic 15 6.13 6.60 6.53 6.27 6.53 6.60 
college student 15 6.27 6.53 6.27 6.60 6.20 6.33 
Victim Fault0 
professional gambler 15 2.40 2.47 2.20 2.00 2.53 2.60 
car mechanic 15 2.13 1.80 1.93 2.53 2.13 1.73 
college student 15 2.40 1.93 2.00 2.47 2.13 2.60 
frhe lower the rating the more the victim deserved the outcome. 
The lower the rating the more the victim was blamed. 
cThe higher the rating the less the incident was perceived as the victim's fault. 
Table 6 (continued) 
Social Settinq 
Walk Bus Stop Niqht Club 
Attempted Attempted Attempted 
Personal Outcome N Rape Rape Rape Rape Rape Rape 
Victim Role Victim Respectability 
professional gambler 15 3.53 3.40 3.80 3.60 4.13 3.47 
car mechanic 15 2.27 1.93 2.60 2.07 2.73 2.13 
college student 15 2.70 1.73 2.00 1.93 3.13 2.07 
Offender • Blamee 
professional gambler 15 1.20 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.20 1.27 
car mechanic 15 1.60 1.00 1.13 1.27 1.47 1.13 
college student 15 1.07 1.07 1.60 1.00 1.33 1.20 
The higher the rating the lower the perceived respectability. 
eThe lower the rating the more the offender was blamed. 
Table 7 
Mean Ratings of Severity of the Incident Variables 
Social Setting 




Attempted Attempted Attempted 
Personal Outcome N Rape Rape Rape Rape Rape Rape 
Victim Role Seriousness of J the Incidenta 
professional gambler 15 3.87 3.40 3.33 3.40 4.20 3.73 
car mechanic 15 3.47 2.20 4.40 3.80 4.40 3.20 
college student 15 4.13 2.93 3.53 3.20 3.67 2.87 
Offender Punishment*3 
professional gambler 15 2.73 2.53 2.93 3.07 2.07 2.40 
car mechanic 15 2.53 2.13 2.80 2.40 2.27 2.60 
college student 15 3.27 1.93 2.00 1.93 2.87 2.60 
^The lower the rating the more serious the incident was perceived. 
The lower the rating the larger the recommended punishment. 
